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ABSTRACT 
International law is challenged to ensure the legal and legitimate use of force by states 
against non-state terrorist groups. Such groups evade easy classification as criminals or 
armed forces. Their organization, methods and targets are simultaneously local in 
application, but global in impact. They attack the foundations of state identity and 
legitimacy, including the monopoly on use of force, but are not state actors. Non-state 
actor threats are not unprecedented, but states and international law have never had to 
contend with non-state actors possessing global reach and force, resources and influence 
on par with some states, which creates a dilemma for contemporary states and jus ad 
bellum—to adhere to principles of international law and customs of legitimate state 
action, or to ensure the security of the state’s citizens. The predicament is incompatible 
with the notion that, in the modern era, the use of force by states is to be limited, 
governed and made legitimate by the rule of law. State use of force without legal 
authorization creates severe issues of legitimacy, with politically and socially 
destabilizing effects. This paper examines these issues in full and  identifies key trends 
and potential avenues for legal reform. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
International law is challenged when faced with the problem of consistently 
ensuring the legal and legitimate use of force by states against non-state terrorist groups, 
often acting transnationally, if not globally. Non-state terrorist actors push the limits of 
modern, international law on state use of force in self-defense. Such groups evade easy 
classification as international criminals or formal, armed forces. Their use of force is at 
once both criminal and a form of political, or religious, expression. Their organizational 
structures, methods and targets are simultaneously intensely local in application and 
operation, but often truly global in reach and impact. They attack the very foundations of 
nation-state identity and legitimacy, including the state-monopoly on the use of military 
force, as well as the state’s ability to ensure social and economic stability, but they are 
not state actors. Standing in opposition to such actors is the modern state and the customs 
and conventions of international law on the use of force.  
B. THE NATURE OF NON-STATE ACTORS VS. STATE ACTORS 
While threats posed by non-state actors are hardly unprecedented, never before 
have states and international law and custom had to contend with a type of non-state actor 
possessing both global reach and the ability to bring force, resources and influence on par 
with some states, or at least enough to impact the authority of a state significantly. Such 
actors and the threat they pose are in opposition to many of the assumptions and 
principles that have shaped current jus ad bellum, or the rights to wage war, if not 
international law itself, which creates a dilemma for contemporary states—to adhere to 
principles of international law and customs of legitimate state action, or to ensure the 
security of the state’s citizens. This vacuum must be addressed to ensure international 
peace and security.  
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C. THE CURRENT FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON STATE 
ACTORS 
Contemporary international law on the use of force by nation-states was 
developed by nation-states to govern the conditions under which such states can use force 
to defend themselves and their allies against threats from other states. For example, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, aka the Paris Pact, aka General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 
signed August 27, 1928, which condemns “recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies.” This body of law operates on the assumption that the use of 
force should be limited and used as a last resort in the international arena, which is 
justified by the governing statutes of international organizations and the historical 
traditions of jus ad bellum (summarized from Cook, 2001, pp. 20–24). The underlying 
theory of this framework for just war is that through its application, states can limit the 
use of force and its destructive effects, facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and 
establish transparency on what justifies and legitimizes the necessary use of force by 
states (Blakesly, 2001, ch. 14). 
D. A MISMATCH OF LAW AND REALITY 
Confusion is created, however, when this body of law and tradition is applied to 
the use of force by modern states against non-state actors in the form of global terrorist 
groups who operate in secret, hiding in states with whom the United States is often, 
otherwise at peace, if not allied (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 264). This uncertainty is caused by: 
first, the application of a body of law to a type of actor it was not originally intended 
for—state vs. non-state actors (Kaldor, 2001, pp. 69–70), second, by its application to a 
type of warfare it did not anticipate—low-level, ongoing, asymmetrical conflict fought 
literally within populations, often without clear or immediate strategic ends (Smith, 2007, 
pp. 35–36), and, third to a form of conflict global in scope, yet directed against very 
particular individuals or groups, within the borders of multiple, foreign states, calling into 
question otherwise longstanding assumptions about definitions of state sovereignty, and 
in short, the identity of the state itself and the legitimacy of its actions (Kilcullen, 2001, p. 
264). 
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This confusion creates problems. First, it calls into question the legality and 
legitimacy of the use of force by states against terrorist organizations abroad. Such 
legality and legitimacy is vital to gaining both international support for and cooperation 
against terrorist organizations, as well as the support and cooperation of the local, 
domestic populations amongst whom modern war is fought (Smith, 2001, pp. 35–36), 
while also making officials of the state using force open to international criminal 
prosecution. Questionable legality of the use of force by states against terror groups also 
severely weakens the development of a simple, unifying, easily expressed narrative 
rooted in liberal rights critical to countering the narrative used by terror groups to 
legitimize their own existence and actions (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 7). Second, it creates a 
situation in which a state facing a terror threat is potentially forced to act outside of 
international law to pursue otherwise legitimate targets (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 532). Such an 
impasse potentially jeopardizes international law and the relations of states, undermining 
a fundamental source of nation-state identity and how states relate to one another—the 
legitimate control of and authority over the use of force.  
The realities of this problem can be seen in contemporary news headlines. One 
need only consider recent United States (U.S.) military action taken in Pakistan to kill 
Osama Bin Laden to see the practical implications. On May 1, 2011, U.S. military forces 
and intelligence agents launched a strike in Abbottabad, Pakistan, presumably originating 
from outside of Pakistan. The mission put troops on the ground, deep within Pakistani 
territory just outside of the capital Islamabad and 1/3 of a mile from Pakistan’s “West 
Point.” The troops used lethal force and stayed long enough to gather an apparently large 
volume of intelligence before leaving the country. News reports indicated that the 
Pakistani government was informed of the mission after it was well underway. While 
cooperation with the Pakistani government on intelligence gathering had led to the strike, 
the Pakistani government had been given no indication of the mission’s development.  
No question remains, whatsoever, that Osama Bin Laden was a criminal and 
murderer, that he represented an ongoing threat to U.S. national security, that his killing 
was morally justified, and that it was in line with American national security interests, if 
not global interests. Yet, it is necessary to take a step back, objectively, and consider the 
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legal issues brought to light by this type of use of force, the precedent it sets, and the 
practical impact it has on the U.S.’s ability to pursue its long-term security interests 
around the world. Counter-terrorism requires a tenuous balancing act between the 
enforcement of law, and preservation of order and security. A global, non-state terrorist 
group presents a particularly difficult challenge for jus ad bellum on self-defense, 
because by definition, it is not a sovereign state, yet still often possesses the ability to 
control and use force like one, while still never holding sovereign territory of its own. 
Consequently, however surgical and limited this strike was, little doubt exists that 
to execute it, U.S. forces crossed into a sovereign state’s territory, without its consent or 
any clear legal authorization, to kill a person, albeit perhaps a legitimate military target, 
and seize property on its soil. In the aftermath of the strike, U.S. relations with Pakistan 
reached a new low, with the leaking of the name of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA’s) station chief in Pakistan, CIA informants in Pakistan being arrested by the 
Pakistani government, the expulsion of U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) military advisors, 
the near resignation of the Chief of the Pakistani Army, the condemnation of the United 
States by Pakistan’s spy chief in the Pakistani parliament, ever worse Pakistani public 
opinion of the United States, and stronger ties between Pakistan and Iran (Connelly, 
2011). Indeed, on July 21, 2011, the President of Pakistan claimed that he had received a 
pledge from the United States that it would no longer pursue unilateral raids in Pakistan, 
such as the one used to strike Osama Bin Laden (Borger, 2011). 
Realists would counter, quite naturally, “Who cares? We got him, he’s dead, our 
interests are served, a mortal enemy is gone and our relationship with Pakistan has 
always been fee for service anyway.” Yet, use of force like this and other historical 
examples, taken in combination with ongoing, targeted, U.S. drone strikes in places like 
South Waziristan (RRTNews, 2011), South Yemen (The Express Tribune News, 2011), 
and Somalia (Eurasia Review, 2011), present a significant problem for how the United 
States understands and uses the basic tenets of international law on self-defense to use 
force legally and legitimately in self-defense against non-state actors in the context of 
global terrorism.  
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Was Osama Bin Laden a legitimate military target in an ongoing war of self-
defense? Does Al Qaeda’s ongoing terror campaign amount to an armed attack justifying 
use of force in self-defense? Can states like the United States legitimately use force 
against Bin Laden even years after his organization’s last major strike on U.S. sovereign 
territory? Can it do so on another country’s territory, without its consent? Is its 
annexation of another state’s sovereign territory legal and legitimate, even when that state 
perhaps lacked effective control over the non-state actor in its territory? When, if ever, 
does the necessity and immanence of a threat permit anticipatory self-defense? In sum, 
the question must be raised as to just how far a state can take its inherent right of self-
defense, in terms of time, space, and level of force, before the law and norms of self-
defense are broken, or, indeed, forced to evolve. Furthermore, if such law and norms are 
changing, the reasons why must be examined in greater detail. Such use of force 
potentially threatens in the long run to politicize international law and create an expanded 
definition and custom of state self-defense. In addition, this use of force has the potential 
to further destabilize places like Pakistan, a nuclear power where many, real, ongoing 
threats against the United States remain, harbored, knowingly or unknowingly, by an 
increasingly fragile government whose military is increasingly unable to ensure domestic 
order, let alone eliminate fundamentalist bases of operation in its federally governed 
territories (Military Top Brass, 2011). These problems can, at least in part, be eased, 
through a clearer and stronger international legal regime on the use of force in self-
defense, against groups like Al Qaeda by giving the use of such force greater legitimacy 
and authority. 
Jus ad bellum must evolve, as it has before, to account for present-day context, 
the nature of modern warfare, and the evolution of state sovereignty to address the 
challenges associated with a state using force against a non-state, global terrorist actor 
successfully. By viewing the problem in such a holistic manner, the law can be reformed 
to avoid a conflict between legality and self-defense. 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The predicament described above, between legality and security, is incompatible 
with the notion that, in the modern era, the use of force by states is to be limited, 
governed and made legitimate by the rule of law. Beyond the purely legal ramifications 
of compromising the letter of treaty obligations, state use of force without legal 
authorization creates severe issues of the legitimacy of such force, which can, in turn, 
have politically and socially destabilizing effects, both locally and globally. Literature on 
this topic has, to date, identified such deficiencies, but only considered them in terms of 
contemporary laws and practices themselves—it has identified the problems and 
examined them in terms of current law and convention, but not considered, in depth, the 
historical, military, and political factors that could guide successful reforms. 
Consequently, this research project begins to address such deficiencies. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This research project utilizes a form of legal policy analysis to examine its main 
problem. The primary issue being analyzed is the apparent inability of international law 
to consistently ensure the legal and legitimate use of force by states against global, non-
state terrorist groups. This gap in international law creates a paradox for states—are they 
to rightly defend themselves or unjustly break international law, calling into question the 
legality and legitimacy of their actions, while protecting their citizens? This problem is 
inherently rooted in the law and policy of international relations. As such, it is best 
examined using a form of legal policy analysis. Policy analysis allows for a thorough 
review of existing law and policy, its strengths and weaknesses, and ultimately, analytical 
results that yield recommendations for policy improvements. By combining standard 
policy analysis methods with a proven method of legal issue analysis, it is possible to 
arrive at a research methodology best suited to the problem at hand in this project.  
The specific form of policy analysis utilized in this paper is a modified form of 
the standard issue, rule, application, conclusions method of legal analysis, or “IRAC” 
(Lawnerds.com). IRAC involves the definition of the legal issue in question, a detailed 
review of the current legal rules, precedents and influences most relevant to the issue, 
analysis of the application of the law to the facts of the case in question, and finally, 
conclusions on how the law should judge the facts of the case in light of the issue. In this 
case, IRAC is used to: first, identify the legal and policy problems created when 
contemporary international law and jus ad bellum are used by states to justify their use 
force in defense against global, non-state terror groups, second, define the legal rules and 
conventions currently comprising international law and jus ad bellum, as well as the vital 
outcomes and end-states that such laws and practices are intended to create in the global 
arena, third, examine the adequacy and limitations of this body of law and practice when 
applied to the facts of a global, non-state terror group through the lens of three, major 
influences, including historical context, the nature of warfare, and definitions of state 
sovereignty, and fourth, compare the analytical results of step three to the desired  
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outcomes of international law identified in step two, so as to arrive at conclusions on 
criteria and guidelines for the reform of international law and practice that can ensure the 
legal and legitimate use of force by states against global, non-state terror actors. 
The data required for this analysis is inherently qualitative in nature. It first must 
substantiate the main problem at hand through accounts and analysis of current events, 
second, document the content of current law and practice on state use of force, third, 
characterize the nature of modern, global terror groups, fourth, demonstrate how 
contemporary context differs from the historical foundations of international law and 
practice, fifth describe and substantiate how modern warfare is evolving, and sixth, 
identify trends in the changing nature of the relationship of the individual to the state. 
Sources include primary sources, such as international treaties, case law, and historical 
accounts, and secondary sources, such as legal, policy, and history journal articles, other 
scholarly works, and accounts and analyses of current events. 
If applied with sufficient rigor, this method should provide a path for reform, 
which, if followed, could help bridge the current gap between self-defense and legitimacy 




III. LEGAL ISSUE DEFINED 
To employ IRAC effectively in examining this paper’s overarching problem, it is 
first necessary to identify the core legal issue that is the basis for its larger policy 
analysis. The core legal issue at work in this paper is the adequacy of modern jus ad 
bellum, the provisions of United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 51, and related case law 
and international custom, for ensuring the legal and legitimate use of force in self-defense 
against global, non-state terrorist groups by states (UN Charter, 1945b). As to be seen, 
Article 51 and its “inherent right of self-defense” are at the heart of contemporary 
international law on the use of force by states in self-defense from acts of aggression 
(O’Connell, 2008, pp. 240–285). To examine this central issue effectively, it is essential 
first to identify the black letter law of self-defense and breakdown its tenets, then review 
the case law and customs that further define it, and finally, review how this body of law 
has, to date, been applied. In particular, this issue is examined through the lens of: (1) the 
relevant portions of the UN Charter, its drafting history and apparent intentions, (2) 
related international custom affecting the use and interpretation of these UN Charter 
provisions, (3) the apparent goals and desired outcomes of such law, and (4) case law 
applying this law and custom in practice, as related to state use of force against terrorist 
groups, including state-sponsored and non-state actor, global terror groups.  
Such focus allows for understanding the overall goals and intentions of the Article 
51 regime and then compares them to the reality of its application. By focusing attention 
on this area of international law and central legal issue, it is then possible to understand 
the current state of jus ad bellum, and in turn, begin to identify the larger trends that may 
be limiting its successful application.  
In relation, of equal importance is defining the legal issues on which this analysis 
does not focus. This examination does not focus on the UN Charter’s rights of collective 
self-defense and security, state acts of reprisal or retaliation, or the formal definitions of 
warfare, its onset or conclusion. Similarly, it does not address issues of jus in bello, or 
actual conduct during war, which includes the tenets of the Geneva Conventions, law and 
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custom on types, degrees, and targets of use of force in combat, or international war 
crimes prosecutions. When necessary, these other areas of international law are referred 
to for reference, but not for purposes of examination. Instead, the focus again is on how 
and when international law, and related case law and custom, effectively authorize the 
legal and legitimate use of force by states against global, non-state actors and the issues 
created by attempts to apply such rules to include the creation of ambiguities or grey 
zones in the law.  
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IV. RULES AND CUSTOM  
A. OVERVIEW 
The following section reviews the current state of jus ad bellum and focuses on 
international law and customs related to the use of force in self-defense against global, 
non-state terrorist actors. The goal of this section is to capture the contemporary state of 
such law with particular focus on its relevance to global, non-state terror actors. 
B. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EVOLUTION OF JUS AD BELLUM 
Western concepts of just war can be traced to ancient Rome and the judgments of 
the jus fetiales priests who were charged with determining, amongst other things, bellum 
justum and bellum injustum—just and unjust war. Rules of Roman warfare required a 
formal demand for satisfaction be made of a Roman enemy, followed by a formal 
declaration of war. Such requirements were not merely procedural, but rather, often used 
to ensure and determine the legitimacy and justness of the claims leading to war 
(Dinstein, 2005, p. 64). As Rome Christianized, the concept of just pretense evolved to 
the notion of divine will or natural law—war was just so long as it was in harmony with 
the will of God, or, more to the point, the authorization of the Church. St. Augustine thus 
established the concept that all war was deplorable, but, when necessary, the cause of war 
had to be just. A just war thus punished wrongs and restored order (Maogato, 2005, p. 
11). These Christian, natural-law based notions of just war soon gave way, by the 15th 
and 16th centuries, to the concept of self-defense (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4). 
With the rise of the sovereign, princely state, and by the 17th century, the advent 
of the Thirty Years War between Catholic and Protestant European states, it became clear 
that war could justly be fought by those sides of a conflict, or no side. War had thus 
evolved to be viewed as a legal, positivist right of a state (Maogato, 2005, p. 11). Grotius, 
regarded as a father of international law, presented a new legalistic notion of self-
defense—a right that a state could employ to protect its property, citizenry and interests 
under certain conditions (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 1). War was no longer universally 
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assumed a moral wrong, fought only to affect justice and restore order—it was a state 
prerogative to be exercised under certain, defined conditions following some form of 
injury (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 1). This idea marked a critical evolution—a general 
presumption that war was prohibited was replaced by a notion that war was a just right of 
states, regularly used to defend state interests.  
With the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state was 
established as a principle actor in global affairs, or, for the first time, truly “international” 
affairs (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4). The state was sovereign over its own territory, and, 
outside its borders; in the international arena, it was free to assert its rights, including 
those of self-defense and self-preservation, in what was considered the ungoverned 
domain of international affairs. Warfare was inherent in the rights of state sovereignty—
viewed as a regular function in the balancing act that was international affairs of the 17th 
to 19th centuries (Maogato, 2005, p. 12). 
This expansive, rights-based notion of justified, sovereign state warfare would 
morph, however, as Europe concluded, and began to recover from the wars of Napoleonic 
aggression (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4). With the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and 
subsequent Concert of Europe, the concept of balance of power was restored in European 
affairs and warfare, though still a clear, sovereign right, that became viewed as an action 
of last resort, pursued only after what amounted to judicial procedures under the Concert 
system to maintain order and the status quo in Europe (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4), and then, 
with a very clear declaration of onset and end of hostilities with clearly defined, strategic 
aims—in a word, balance (Maogato, 2005, p. 21).  
By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, warfare itself began to evolve from the 
very formal, highly organized and regimented process of the 17th through early 19th 
centuries, into the industrial, democratized, technologically advanced, and extremely 
expansive and destructive “state on state” conflict with which the World War I (WWI) 
and World War II (WWII) generations became all too familiar. Advancing on the 
principles established by the Congress of Vienna of 1815, and recognizing the significant 
change in warfare occurring by the late 19th century, the Hague Peace Conferences of 
1899 and 1907 began a series of attempts to not merely regulate the onset of war, but, 
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gradually, to actually limit the right of states’ use of force in international affairs (Sharp, 
2010, p. 337). The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 resulted in two treaties 
that established the first formal, written statements of the “global” rules of war and were 
nascent attempts to establish clear and predictable means of ensuring peaceful dispute 
settlement meant to give states the chance to step back from the brink of conflict (Yale 
Law School, Hague Peace Conferences, 1899 and 1907). The subsequent Bryan Treaties 
signed beginning in 1913 committed the United States and other states to the use of an 
international commission for the resolution of interstate disputes before engaging in 
hostilities (Law Library–American Law and Legal Information, Bryan Treaties). No 
doubt exists that these early attempts failed to prevent WWI. However, they represent a 
very important, international, legal precedent—war was no longer regarded as a matter of 
rational, sovereign, state choice and a regular component of international affairs. Indeed, 
the onset of war was increasingly becoming viewed as a failure of a modern international 
system. 
Following WWI, the League of Nations was established by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations via Part 1 of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which created an 
international organization dedicated to the peaceful resolution of international disputes 
and regulation of world affairs (Yale Law School, The Covenant of the League of 
Nations; Yale Law School, The Versailles Treaty). These treaties formally ended the 
classic concept of an inherent sovereign, state right to wage war to preserve its existence 
(Sharp, 2010, p. 338). While closer to a true prohibition on the use of force in 
international affairs, the reality was that all the League treaties did was give the League’s 
Council the right to issue formal recommendations to states about to enter conflict, with 
the intent of mediating the conflict (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4). The resurgent concept of 
self-defense, was in practice, viewed as a moderated right of self-preservation, without a 
clear, legal definition, or conditions for its utilization. The League’s system was further 
hampered by the fact that its commitment to respect and preserve the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states, was limited to member states—not a universal declaration 
(Maogato, 2005, p. 24).  
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The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 declared a prohibition of war and gave clear 
recognition to a legal right of self-defense (Sharp, 2010, p. 338). That prohibition was, 
unfortunately, without any real teeth, as it was not linked to a sanctions system or other 
means of enforcement. The prohibition also only applied to formal war and not the use of 
force in general (Maogato, 2005, p. 29). Finally, it failed to define self-defense, when and 
how it could be used. All these limitations accepted, the Pact signaled the first time that 
the international community accepted the idea that war was not a legitimate means of 
pursuing state interests and of resolving international disputes. It established the idea in 
international law that only a very limited type of force was legitimate in international 
affairs, and that the international community had a right to regulate such force (Dinstein, 
2005, p. 83). 
This stream of custom, tradition and treaties on jus ad bellum next flowed into the 
post-World War II (WWII) world and the establishment of the United Nations. Before 
turning toward a thorough review of contemporary jus ad bellum, with a focus on its 
relationship to the current threat of global, non-state terror groups, it is vital to note that 
this entire historical sequence has focused on the law of state conflict. As to be seen, 
instances have occurred, historically in which states have used force against, or in support 
of, non-state actors, such as pirates, mercenaries, armed bands, or even domestic 
insurgents supported by a 3rd party state to hurt mutual enemies. Yet, through it all, 
international law, by definition, indeed, even within its very name, “inter-national” has 
sought to regulate the use of force by states themselves. Arguably, never before has the 
world seen the impact of non-state actors on questions of international law on just war as 
it does today, and not since the height of the use of mercenaries and pirates during the 





C. MODERN JUS AD BELLUM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL, NON-
STATE TERROR ACTORS 
Modern jus ad bellum is rooted in the UN Charter. With respect to this analysis, 
the most relevant portions are found in Chapter II, Article 2, Section 4 (“2(4)”) (United 
Nations Charter, 1945a), and Chapter VII, Article 51 (“Article 51”) (United Nations 
Charter, 1945b). These provisions read as follows. 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations; and 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
A literal reading of 2(4) reveals what is arguably the UN Charter’s most 
remarkable and important innovation in international law and relations—the clear, 
general prohibition of the use of force in international relations (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 7). 
Some have interpreted the explicit reference to “territorial integrity” and “political 
independence” as limiting this prohibition to only states themselves, and to only state 
uses of force impacting states’ independence (Dinstein, 2005, p. 204). However, the 
language of “any other manner inconsistent” along with other provisions of the UN 
Charter, drafting intent, and state practice demonstrate the fact that 2(4) is intended to 
institute a full prohibition on the use of force on both UN members and non-members 
alike and on all uses of force in international relations (Dinstein, 2005, p. 204). 
The significance of this general prohibition to modern jus ad bellum on self-
defense cannot be understated. Under the UN Charter, a fundamental assumption exists 
that force will not be used in international affairs (Sharp, 2010, p. 340). The general 
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prohibition does not simply establish the notion that force is something to be regulated or 
monitored, or allowed only for attempts at cooling off or with proper notice to a potential 
adversary. Use of force in self-defense by a state, against any actor, must occur as a 
limited exception to the general rule against using force to pursue national interests, 
legitimate or otherwise. Self-defense is a special exception to the general prohibition, 
whose use is not to be taken lightly and must be well justified. While limited, this 
exception, as Article 51 reveals, is an inherent right (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 7).  
Article 2, Section 4, and its general prohibition on force are not a suicide pact for 
states. Article 51 establishes an inherent right to self-defense. The meaning of the term 
inherent has been debated; however, it is generally accepted that the term is meant to 
refer to the principle that the state has a right to take such measures as are required to 
ensure the safety of its citizenry and preserve its political boundaries and identity (Sharp, 
2010, p. 341). This concept of self-defense as a right as evolved, as seen, over the 
centuries from being viewed as a natural right defined in terms of moral action, to a 
positivist right defined by Vattel meant not merely as a legally defined right, but a duty of 
the state itself at the heart of its purpose for existing as a sovereign, to the modern notion 
in the UN Charter, prescribing a right to use force under a limited exception to a general 
prohibition (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 4). Nothing in the UN Charter is thus intended to 
impair this right. However, as Article 51 clarifies, use of this right is only permitted until 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) has, essentially, caught up with events and taken 
measures to restore international order under the UN Charter’s provisions for either 
collective self-defense or collective security (Chapter VII in general, and in particular, 
Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42).  
As clear as the language of 2(4), Article 51 and the charter’s provisions for the 
operations of the UNSC are, the reality of their application since their establishment in 
1945 has been a function of international legal custom and case law and political realities.  
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D. CRITICAL FACTORS WHEN EVALUATING THE LEGITIMATE 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 51 
In practice, legal justification for the use of force in self-defense, even under the 
modern UN Charter regime, must be analyzed through the lens of four, relatively old 
legal traditions, including occurrence of an armed attack, necessity, immediacy, and 
proportionality. As seen later, these four factors used to justify self-defense must be 
considered under two, separate types of scenarios, namely, self-defense in response to an 
armed attack by a state, and self-defense in response to an armed attack from a state. For 
purposes of this paper’s focus, the latter is the most critical; however, current jus ad 
bellum on self-defense must be reviewed to understand both fully. 
1. Armed Attack 
No formal or standard definition of armed attack exists. As noted above, the 
modern expression of the term is rooted in Article 51 (O’Connell, 2008, ch. 7.2). 
Colloquially, the term defines a type and level of force that amounts to something more 
than a mere skirmish or criminal act that is severe enough, located appropriately, at the 
right kind of target by the right kind of actor to amount to a use of force sufficient to 
justify a state using force to defend itself. As seen in this paper’s later review of the 
Nicaragua case, the term is clearly one of art. Five considerations, and a series of sub-
considerations, based on international case law and custom, are essential to understanding 
the concept of “armed attack” and determining if one has actually occurred, including: 
inception; scale and effect, as well as the concept of accumulation, locale, target, and 
responsibility and sponsorship including issues of support to armed bands, raiders and/or 
terrorists. In addition, for the purposes of this particular examination, the special case of 
armed attack by a non-state actor will be considered in detail to understand when and 




Article 51 is quite explicit that invocation of the inherent right of self-
defense must follow an armed attack. Inception, therefore, requires that an armed attack 
should actually be underway or have occurred for a state to use self-defense. The notion 
of armed attack, under Article 51, was developed in an era during which the state-on-state 
conflict was the norm with the according build up of forces at borders, saber rattling and 
diplomatic posturing. While surprise or “short notice” attacks were hardly unprecedented 
before 1945, the notion that a state could bring truly catastrophic, state-life-threatening 
force, or strike a civilian target causing massive civilian casualties, simply was not yet a 
full reality. As noted earlier, however, the UN Charter is not a suicide pact. In the modern 
age, the threat of nuclear weapons and “surprise” acts of terrorism, detected only through 
advanced intelligence services, often with only limited time at best before their 
occurrence, makes it almost impractical for a state to tolerate actually being struck by an 
armed attack before using self-defense force. Therefore, the concept of inception has 
been interpreted to require, essentially, that a state “see that the gun in being loaded or 
that the trigger is literally being pulled” to demonstrate inception of an armed attack—it 
need not wait for the bullet to strike its target. As Sir Humphrey Waldock stated, “When 
there is convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack 
being actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though 
it has not passed the frontier” (Dinstein, 2005, p. 191). 
b. Scale, Effect and the Concept of Accumulation 
To amount to an armed attack, and allow the right of self-defense to vest, 
the “scale and effects” of the force used by an actor must be of “significant scale” 
(Nicaragua, ICJ, 1986). While this concept is an ambiguous standard, factors, such as the 
nature and capabilities of the organization conducting the attack, the extent of human 
injury and physical damage caused (or likely to have been caused if the attack is foiled or 
otherwise unsuccessful), the relation of the attack to previous attacks and the method and 
means used to conduct it, are all relevant to determining “significance.” As the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has implied, the bar is fairly low to establish scale and 
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effect of significance. An operation must amount to more than a “mere frontier incident” 
to demonstrate significance. However, that incident can involve rebels or armed bands 
supported by a third-party state (not necessarily soldiers officially of another state’s 
army), demonstrating, in turn, a threat or use of force amounting to an intervention in the 
internal or external affairs of another state (Nicaragua, ICJ, 1986). 
More recent case law has affirmed the notion that a spectrum of degrees of 
force used that can establish significant scale and effect exists (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). 
In the Oil Platforms case, the ICJ expressly affirmed the distinction between ‘most grave’ 
and “less grave forms” of the use of force in the context of interstate conflicts (Oil 
Platforms, ICJ, 2003). In DRC—Uganda, insofar as it left open whether states could 
respond to “attacks by irregular forces,” it contemplated self-defense only if directed 
against “large-scale attacks” (DRC-Uganda, ICJ, 2005). Recent jurisprudence thus 
suggests that the distinction between armed attacks and more limited uses of force is still 
very relevant (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). 
Perhaps of greatest significance to the doctrine of “scale and effect” is the 
potential development of a related doctrine of “accumulation of events,” which 
previously had received little support. This doctrine of course affects many aspects of the 
law on self-defense. As regards recent jurisprudence, the doctrine was much discussed by 
the litigants in the Cameroon—Nigeria, DRC—Uganda, and Oil Platforms cases. The 
International Court of Justice (CJ) seemed inclined to accept the notion—hence its 
statement, in Oil Platforms, that “even taken cumulatively” a series of incidents did not 
qualify as an armed attack on the United States. These statements suggest a trend towards 
the recognition of the “accumulation doctrine,” but may require further consolidation. 
The concept appeals to those who have long criticized the gap between Article 2(4) and 
Article 51 UNC that more than implies that states may at times have to accept low-level 
uses of force or “pin pricks.”  
However, the “accumulation doctrine,” while closing the gap between 
Article 2(4) and Article 51 UNC, produces serious side effects, it undermines the 
temporal dimension (discussed later when exploring the concept of “Immediacy”) of self-
defense and risks turning a temporal right into a potentially, open-ended license to use 
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force. This factor is of great significance to the question of how and when self-defense is 
justified against a global-non-state terrorist group; as in many cases, it is the “pin pricks” 
of such groups that collectively, over time, come to justify, in the eyes of the victim state, 
the use of force to stop such a group’s ongoing campaign of violence against a state. 
Israeli experiences with “accumulation” along its borders with Palestinian and Lebanese 
borders are prime examples of this factor at work, and on a larger scale, U.S. experiences 
with Al Qaeda’s campaign of violence outside the United States (e.g., embassy bombings 
and the USS Cole) prior to its major strike on 9/11 are also indicative of the concept of an 
accumulation of attacks giving rise to a justification for the use of force in self-defense. 
In reality, no bright line rule exists on when accumulation has reached a sufficient degree 
to find a vested right of self-defense. This factor will likely always have to be taken in 
context with the other factors explored in this section.  
c. Locale 
The location factor is a fairly straightforward element. Typically, armed 
attack must occur across the frontier of the victim state within its boundary. The attacker 
can cross the frontier prior to the actual use of force. Numerous other location scenarios 
exist, for example: the attacker can use force against the target state’s territory, outside its 
actual, national borders, as in the case of an embassy, or it can strike the target state from 
a third party’s location, or strike the target state’s territory or possessions in neutral 
territory, such as a battleship in international waters, and it can even strike target state 
territory within its own borders, such as a military installation or embassy within its own 
borders. Indeed, the Iranian assault on the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979 is a classic 
example of the locale factor under the concept of armed attack (ICJ, Tehran, 1980). In 
short, so long as the attacker strikes the sovereign territory or possessions of the target 




Related to the locale factor is the concept of target of an armed attack. 
Essentially, force must be targeted against the territory of the state being attacked, or its 
military or public possessions outside its borders, to constitute armed attack (Dinstein, 
2005, pp. 199–201). In certain instances, when sufficient force has been used, force 
against a significant number of private vessels or aircraft of a victim state can also 
constitute armed attack. Armed attack can also be constituted when the citizens of a 
target state, acting as diplomatic or official envoys, are targeted by an attacking actor. A 
serious point of debate is whether the targeting of normal citizens, outside their home-
state, carrying no official status of any kind, by an attacking state, can constitute armed 
attack (Dinstein 2005, pp. 199–201). Increasingly, scholars argue that, particularly in the 
context of transnational, mass casualty acts of terrorism, armed attack may vest a right of 
self-defense when a large number of one state’s nationals are killed or taken hostage 
abroad. The increased use of rescue missions to pull citizens out of foreign territory under 
dire conditions (e.g., embassy rescue missions), and, of course, the increasing number of 
major, global, terrorist acts, supports this thinking. However, for the time being, armed 
attack does not appear to have occurred when ordinary nationals are targeted abroad—the 
vesting of the right to self-defense under such circumstances would, under current 
notions of state sovereignty, push the figurative notion of state boundaries well beyond 
their actual reality (Dinstein, 2005, pp. 199–201). 
e. Responsibility and Sponsorship  
The concepts of responsibility and sponsorship, typically arising in the 
contexts of armed bands, terrorists, and non-state actors, are clearly of great relevance to 
the issue of how and when self-defense is justified against a global, non-state terrorist 
group. Article 51, as seen, declares that nothing shall impair the inherent right of self-
defense when an armed attack occurs against a member state. When this language is 
compared to that of 2(4), clearly prohibiting one state’s threat or use of force against 
another, without doubt, it can be seen that the UN Charter can, when it so desires, 
identify state use of force, as opposed to other forms of force, against a member state. 
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Therefore, in strict legal terms, the right of self-defense vests when any actor, or source 
of force, commits an armed attack against a member. However, reality is far more 
complicated than strict, black letter law. Issues of state-sponsorship, state-omission, or 
essentially negligence, and in turn, appropriately justified application of force in self-
defense, make the factor of responsibility and sponsorship critical to and complicating for 
the central issue of this paper. The factor of responsibility and sponsorship is best 
addressed in two main areas, the first being state support to armed bands and terrorist 
groups that become de facto state organs, and the second, armed attacks by actual, non-
state actors. 
f. Armed Bands, Terrorists and State Support 
The most widely accepted legal standard on this issue was set forth in the 
Nicaragua case, which sets a high standard for attributing the actions of a non-state actor 
to a state in the context of an armed attack. A general agreement on the nature of the acts 
now appears to exist, which can be treated as constituting armed attacks (Gray, 2004, pp. 
108–134). In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be 
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international 
border, but also the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which execute acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as 
to amount to an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, or its substantial 
involvement therein (Nicaragua, ICJ, 1986). Nicaragua argued that the United States was 
responsible under international law for violations of humanitarian law committed by the 
Contras, the anti-Sandinista rebel group it supported. The ICJ found that such support 
was insufficient for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by 
the Contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. For 
U.S. conduct to vest legal responsibility it would, in principle, have to be proved that that 
the United States had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the 
course of which the alleged violations were committed (Nicaragua, ICJ, 1986). 
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Indeed, the court went so far as to quote Article 3(g) of the UN General 
Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, which it argued reflected customary international 
law (Dinstein, 2005, p. 201). To clarify, the ICJ determined that the mere supply of arms 
and other support to armed bands cannot be equated with armed attack (Dinstein, 2005, p. 
202). Quite simply, logistical support and provision of arms alone are insufficient to 
demonstrate an armed attack by a supporting state (Schmitt, 2002). 
By this standard, the state to which the acts are to be attributed must be 
substantially involved in an operation so grave it would amount to an armed attack if 
conducted by regular members of its armed forces (Schmitt, 2002, pp. 42–48). What 
seems to run through both the ICJ’s and even Judge Schwebel’s dissenting position is that 
the state must at least exercise significant, perhaps determinative, influence over the 
group’s decision making, as well as play a meaningful role in the specific operations at 
hand, before an armed attack will be imputed to it. However, it is at this point that the 
previously examined factor or accumulation, or “pin pricks” becomes relevant, again. 
Irregular troops, armed bands and terrorist groups typically utilize tactics smaller in scale 
than a full-blown, foreign invasion, which thus takes on a more “hit and run” style. Each 
individual strike is not likely to reach the necessary, significant, scale and effect to 
demonstrate an armed attack has occurred and vest a right of self-defense (Gray, 2004, 
pp. 108–134). However, when a series of such attacks are combined with the additional 
demonstration of state support, evidence of armed attack mounts. When support reaches 
an adequate degree, an armed back or terrorist group can become a de fact organ of a 
state, which helps to establish armed attack. Indeed, little difference exists between a 
formal, regular military unit, and an irregular, armed band or terrorist group, when state 
support crosses a certain threshold (Dinstein, 2005, pp. 202–203). 
The duty to desist from assisting terrorists is further demonstrated in UN 
resolutions and international treaties. In 1996, the General Assembly articulated this duty 
in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security. The declaration 
contended that states must refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating 
in terrorist acts in territories of other states, or from acquiescing in or encouraging 
activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such acts. In doing 
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so, it echoed earlier exhortations in the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and its 1965 
progenitor, Resolution 2131 (1965). Similar prohibitions can be found in Article 2(4) of 
the International Law Commission’s 1954 Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind (Schmitt, 2002, pp. 42–48). 
Article 11, also of the Articles of State Responsibility, sets forth a second 
possibly relevant standard. It provides that “[c]onduct which is not attributable to a state 
under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under 
international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct 
as its own” (Schmitt, 2002, pp. 42–48). 
Case law, beyond Nicaragua, has also supported these declarations, most 
notably in the Corfu Channel. The ICJ held that every state has an obligation to not 
knowingly allow its territory to be used in a manner contrary to the rights of other states 
(Schmitt, 2002, pp. 42–48). 
The next issue, naturally becomes what level of support, or control, 
actually demonstrates state support. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that when a paramilitary group is organized by a foreign state, 
its actions could be considered “acts of de facto state organs” regardless of whether or not 
the controlling state has issued specific instructions (ICTY, 1999). Thus, an armed band 
or terrorist group can potentially act with significant autonomy, under this rule, while still 
supporting a finding of state responsibility on the originally, organizing state given 
“effective control.”  
In reality, this concept is a “know it when you see it” test, but the basic 
point is clear—at some point, the bar appears relatively low, a state moves from 
providing mere support, to actually helping to organize a group, and thus, takes on 
responsibility for that group’s actions, and liability for resulting, armed attacks (Dinstein, 
2005, p. 203). State support, particularly toward organizing a group, through act or 
omission, helps demonstrate, with proper context, an armed attack and attributes 
responsibility to the supporting state. 
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Having established the basic tenets of what defines armed attack under 
international statute and case law, the concept of armed attack in the specific context of 
non-state actors is briefly examined. 
g. Armed Attack by Non-State Actors 
As described previously, a basic statutory interpretation of Article 51 and 
Article 2(4) reveals that, strictly speaking, nothing in the UN Charter prescribes that an 
armed attack only come from a state actor to show a vesting of the inherent right to self-
defense (Article 51 and Article 2(4)). Indeed, while a clear, general prohibition against 
state use of force under the UN Charter does exist, any armed attack, from whatever 
source, can be the basis for the use of force by a state in self-defense. Case law supports 
and refines this basic conclusion, and also demonstrates that while facially clear, in 
reality, there has been and continues to be certain discord over the limits of when non-
state action constitutes armed attack (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). 
The International Court of Justice, in its 2004 Advisory Opinion, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
affirmed the inherent right of self-defense when one state commits and armed attack 
against another. It then noted that no explicit stipulation exists under Article 51 that self-
defense only be available when an armed attack is made by a state (Legal Consequences, 
2004). In this case, the ICJ was particularly concerned with the distinction between non-
state actor action as a function of cross-border terrorism and non-state actor action from 
within an occupied territory. As to be seen, this distinction is a vital, and contested one, 
of great significance in the context of the use of self-defense against terrorist groups in 
Afghanistan, as well as the Israeli occupied territories. 
Strictly speaking, when a non-state actor strikes a state from within its 
territory, an armed attack is not demonstrated because it is a case of domestic terrorism or 
internal, civil, armed conflict. For armed attack to be demonstrated, and vest a right of 
self-defense, at least some external factor must be at work in relation to the victim state, 
for Article 51 to take hold (Dinstein, 2005, pp. 204–205). As the Nicaragua case has 
shown, this threshold, of “externality” can be quite low, even in the case of what are 
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objectively civil, or internal conflicts, although subjective—a state foreign to the victim 
state can offer aid to such an extent that armed attack is demonstrated (Nicaragua, ICJ, 
1986), by showing the conflict is more than internal and/or domestic and  that the 
terrorists are acting as de facto state-actors or have received a sufficient level of support 
to demonstrate an external, state level of control. As an aside, as seen in subsequent 
chapters, as the nature of the use of force in modern warfare is changing, so too is the line 
between inherently civil, internal conflicts, and international ones. Also, as noted above, 
a non-state actor can launch its attack from a location outside any state’s jurisdiction, 
such as the high seas or ungoverned territory—the most classic example being piracy, as 
described in Article 101 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Dinstein, 
2005, p. 205). However, ultimately, armed attack analysis in the context of non-state 
actors causes individuals to probe for a state of origin, from which the non-state actors 
launched their attack. Whether the state from which the attack was launched was actively 
conspiring with and supporting the group, or passively, if not unknowingly, allowing the 
group to base its operations within its boundaries, has been considered above in the 
discussion of state responsibility—a vital factor in determining how, when, and where the 
right to self-defense can be found and applied (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). 
Indeed, in the 1949 Corfu Channel case, the IJC determined that every 
state is obligated to “not allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states” (Corfu Channel Case, 1948, p. 22). It is thus entirely unlawful for a 
state to allow its territory to be used as a staging ground or sanctuary for terrorists or 
armed bands with designs to strike at other, foreign states, even, ultimately, constituting a 
crime under the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
(Dinstein, 2005, p. 206).  
Corfu’s concept of state liability, even under “passive” circumstances, was 
affirmed by the ICJ in the 1980 Tehran case. The court found that the authorities of one 
state are required to take appropriate actions to protect the interests of a foreign state’s 




1980, pp. 32–3, 44). If they fail to maintain such “vigilance” in their “specific duty,” they 
are liable for acts of omission resulting in wrongful acts by non-state actors in their 
territory against a foreign state.  
While the issue of whether use of force by a non-state actor, emanating 
from a non-sponsoring state, against another state, can truly constitute armed attack 
appears, facially, to have been resolved, it can be seen that much debate has occurred on 
the issue and that the precise determination of exactly whether and when such use of 
force constitutes armed attack remains a matter of “legal art.” The issue is not likely to go 
away. However, the legal response to the events of September 11, 2001 has done much to 
clarify the issue.  
Resolutions 1368 (Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)) and 1373 
(Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)), adopted by the UN Security Council shortly 
after September 11, both recognized and reaffirmed the “inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense” under the UN Charter, in the context of the 9/11 attacks 
themselves. It is true that the Security Council did not, in these resolutions, explicitly use 
the term “armed attack,” and instead, referenced “horrifying terrorist attacks.” However, 
it would be pointless to affirm the right of self-defense in the context of the attacks, 
without more than implicitly accepting the idea that armed attack had in fact occurred 
when Al Qaeda, based out of Afghanistan at minimum with the passive awareness, if not 
acceptance of the governing Taliban regime, struck U.S. sovereign territory.  
If this use of language left any further, lingering doubt on whether armed 
attack had occurred under the UN Charter, the North Atlantic Council subsequently 
invoked for the first time ever Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 
utilizes the term “armed attack” and does so explicitly in the context of the UN Charter 
and Article 51 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2001). The NATO Council found 
that its collective defense measures, which hold that an armed attack against one member 
constitutes an attack against all, were activated by the September 11 attacks. Finally, 
additionally, the Organization of American States (OAS) applied the 1947 Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) and found that the September 11 
terrorist attacks against the United States were attacks against all OAS members, which 
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invoked the Rio Treaty’s Article 3, which, like the North Atlantic Treaty, refers 
specifically to an armed attack and the right to self-defense under the aegis of Article 51 
(Organization of American States, 2001). Thus, taken together, it can be concluded that a 
non-state actor, striking at a victim state from another state, can commit an armed attack 
justifying use of force in self-defense under Article 51, even when the state from which 
the attack is launched has only been negligent. That a global, non-state terrorist group can 
commit an armed attack under the UN Charter is vital to understanding the current state 
of jus ad bellum and how it applies to such actors. However, it is not the end of this 
paper’s examination of international law surrounding such actors and the legitimate use 
of force under contemporary jus ad bellum. 
As seen, the concept of armed attack finds its modern roots in the UN 
Charter’s Article 51—the contemporary foundation of international law on the use of 
force in self-defense. While this vital trigger is prescribed explicitly by treaty, a larger, 
historically more deeply rooted set of factors exists, which must also be accounted for 
when determining whether or not, and how, the use of force is justified in self-defense, 
following the occurrence of an armed attack, both in general and in the case of an armed 
attack by a global, non-state terrorist group. Armed attack alone is not enough to 
determine the boundaries and limitations of acceptable use of force in self-defense, 
against any type of actor. Therefore, it is now necessary to address the factors of 
necessity, immediacy, and proportionality. 
h. The Caroline Case and Correspondences 
The factors of necessity, immediacy, and proportionality, in their modern 
form, are rooted in a series of diplomatic correspondences between Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster and his British counterparts beginning in 1837 resulting from what has 
come to be known as the Caroline Incident. By the mid-1830s, anti-British fervor had 
reached a stage of rebellion in Canada. The steamboat Caroline was being used to ferry 
supplies and personnel in support of the anti-British rebels across the Niagara River, from 
U.S. territory. While it was not clear that the U.S. Government was actively, openly 
supporting these efforts in support of the anti-British insurgency, or even fully aware of 
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them, it was clear that the support to the rebels was clearly emanating from U.S. territory. 
British forces, therefore, crossed the border into U.S. territory, killed two U.S. citizens, 
seized and set aflame the Caroline, sent her over the Niagara Falls, and then returned to 
British-Canadian territory. The United States protested the British action. The British 
responded by arguing that U.S. law was not being enforced along the border and that they 
had acted out of necessity. Indeed, ultimately, the two sides would agree that the 
circumstances potentially, if not likely, justified the actions taken. The issue was not 
whether the use of force itself was justified, because, as seen previously, prior to the UN 
Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force by states, states possessed, essentially, a 
natural right to go to war for almost any reason, until the late 19th and early 20th century 
(Maogato, 2005, pp. 15–18). The issue at hand was whether Britain had a right to 
anticipatory self-defense, justified by urgent circumstances, without an immediately 
occurring prior attack, which could be exercised on U.S. soil without driving both states 
into a full state of war. 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster answered this question by arguing that 
use of force was in fact permissible so long as the danger posed was “instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation… and the 
defensive acts must not be unreasonable or excessive” (Maogato, 2005, p. 17). Webster’s 
answer is critical because it marks the beginning of an effort to create a legal distinction 
between war and self-defense, which would, in turn, ultimately lead to the notion that war 
was not a natural right of states, and could and should, in fact, be prohibited, with the use 
of force limited only to acts of self-defense. For states like the United States, which was, 
at the time, relatively weak compared to Britain, such a right to self-defensive action, that 
did not constitute a full act of war, was well-received, allowing such states to defend 
themselves and their existence, without engaging in a full blown, potentially terminal 
conflict. In the modern context of terrorism, it can likely be correctly concluded that acts 
of terrorism, or terrorist threats, can also be overwhelming, particularly when a state 
knows of active, imminent plots against its interests and when such plots are designed to 
impose mass casualties. 
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While never formally established by treaty or statute, international case 
law, such as the Nicaragua case, has established Webster’s Caroline factors of necessity, 
immediacy and proportionality as the critical guidelines for determining when and how 
the use of force in self-defense is justified. Indeed, the ICJ confirmed the existence of 
such principles in both the Nicaragua case and the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. In 
Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ noted that the dual condition of necessity and proportionality 
applies to Article 51 of the UN Charter; thereby, verifying the applicability of the 
requirements in both customary and conventional law (Schmitt, 2002). As to be seen, the 
actual application and interpretation of these factors is, like all international law, often 
more a product of perceived custom and tradition, than the results of firm, legal 
adjudicative results. 
2. Necessity 
The principle of necessity requires that the resort to force occur only when no 
other reasonable options remain to frustrate continuation of the armed attack, such as 
negotiation or cease fire (Dinstein, 2005, p. 237). In the context of terrorism and global, 
non-state terrorist actors, the question is generally whether law enforcement operations 
are likely to be sufficient to prevent terrorist groups from conducting otherwise 
imminent, planned attacks. Law enforcement operations may be undertaken by the victim 
state, the state in which the terrorists are based, or, for that matter, any other state. 
Similarly, if a state in which the terrorists are located conducts operations with a high 
probability of success, intended to curtail the terrorist threat and a group’s operations, no 
necessity basis for self-defense by the victim state would exist because the ongoing threat 
would be eliminated (Schmitt, 2002). The victim state may only act against the terrorists 
if classic law enforcement reasonably appears unlikely to net those expected to conduct 
further attacks before they do so (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). It is critical to note that no 
requirement exists for an expectation that law enforcement will fail. Instead, the 
requirement is that success not be expected to prove timely enough to head off a 
continuation of the terrorist campaign. Of course, if no further attacks were anticipated, 
the necessity principle would preclude resort to armed force at all, since contemporary jus 
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ad bellum on self-defense contains no tolerance for acts of retribution or retaliation 
(Schmitt, 2002). This idea is in contrast to assumptions of most, domestic criminal law 
that focuses on delivering justice, often times in the form of balancing out damage 
imposed on citizens. Retribution and retaliation are not permitted under modern jus ad 
bellum because, quite simply, they are punitive in nature and not limited in application, 
sufficient only to eliminate an imminent threat, as the inherent right of self-defense is 
intended (Gray, 2004, p. 125). 
In the case of U.S. action in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime, no guarantee that even a law enforcement effort existed, that was arguably 
proving successful against much of the organization internationally could effectively 
eradicate the threat of another major attack (Gray, 2004, pp. 159–194). At the same time, 
aggressively attacking the senior leadership and denying it a base of operations promised 
great returns in alleviating the threat; far greater than would likely be realized by law 
enforcement in a comparable period. In addition, it must be remembered that the clock 
was ticking. As the United States and its coalition partners planned their response, 
warnings of imminent attacks flowed through intelligence channels with great frequency 
(Schmitt, 2002). Yet, as seen in subsequent chapters, a line does exist between the 
concept of anticipatory self-defense and outright preemptive self-defense—striking at 
someone as they are literally loading a gun as compared to a striking a threatening person 
who simply possesses a gun (Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). In addition, as also seen later in 
this chapter, modern interpretations and applications of the concept of necessity present a 
danger to the UN Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force, which creates a 
potential basis for lasting, ongoing use of force under the guise of self-defense against 
nebulously, or broadly defined, terrorist threats. 
3. Immediacy 
This second condition on the use of force in self-defense stipulates that force 
cannot be used too long after an armed attack. However, two riders of reasonableness 
exist. First, a victim state is not expected to instantly turn from a state of peace to one of 
war (Dinstein, 2005, p. 242). Even in the modern age, realities of communications, 
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logistics, organization, policy and tactical decision making, and ultimately orders, are 
existent. A state is not expected to formulate and act out a response instantly. Second, a 
delay in the defensive use of force can be further tolerated if justifiable delays occur due 
to extenuating circumstances. Such situations can involve attempts at negotiations, such 
as those following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and international attempts at mediating a 
settlement and withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, before coalition forces invaded Iraq to 
liberate Kuwait, nearly a year and a half following the original Iraqi invasion (Dinstein, 
2005, p. 243). Another justifiable delay can involve the existence of sheer distance and 
time that must be covered to bring to bear a use of force in response to an armed attack, 
such as that which Britain had to cover to simply reach the Falkland Islands in 1982 
(Dinstein, 2005, p. 243). 
4. Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality contends that the victim state can use such force 
until it is satisfied that the aggressor is defeated and no longer constitutes a threat (Gray, 
2004, pp. 108–134). Proportionality also conveys that defensive force must be limited in 
nature, with a level of violence and location limited to that required to defeat an on-going 
attack or prevent any reasonably foreseeable ones (Schmitt, 2002). In short, the response 
in self-defense must be no more than necessary to defeat the armed attack and remove the 
threat of reasonably foreseeable future attacks (Dinstein, 2005, pp. 237–242). 
The size, nature and consequences of the response do not, strictly speaking, have 
to be proportional to the size, nature and consequences of the original attack (Gray, 2004, 
pp. 108–134). It would be senseless, if not debilitating, for an equivalency requirement 
for the force used in an armed attack and self-defense to exist. Greater force than the 
original attack is often required to surmount the attack. Indeed, as seen, the inherent right 
to self-defense is intended to ensure that, despite the general prohibition on the use of 
force, states are not rendered helpless in the face of an actual attack (Schmitt, 2002). 
In the context of armed attacks by global, non-state terrorist actors, the same 
principles of proportional self-defense persist. However, again, the force necessary to 
achieve this purpose may far exceed that employed in the attack. Terrorists often operate 
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in dispersed networks and locations. They may be fanatical devotees willing to die for 
their cause. Taking them on is a daunting task that typically requires extremely 
aggressive measures (Schmitt, 2002). In addition, it is in these issues that the line 
between jus ad bellum and jus ad bello can be seen—under jus ad bellum, of concern is 
only the right to wage just war and the right to use force in self-defense in the 
contemporary setting. In that context, proportionality dictates using sufficient, or 
proportional, force, to eliminate an otherwise imminent threat that creates the necessity 
for action (Sharp, 2010, pp. 345–347). Under jus ad bello, its practice and the Geneva 
Conventions, an emphasis is placed on a concept of proportionality meant to ensure the 
use of a level of force that will not unnecessarily injure any state’s citizens or property, 
and preserve the rights of all citizens involved, all of equal value. In reality, of course, 
terrorist groups and states alike make conscious decisions about the relative value of 
citizens in different states and the benefit of saving or hurting them to achieve strategic 
ends. Yet, in the end, the use of military force, however technologically advanced, or 
locally applied, is a blunt instrument—innocent people are almost inevitably hurt by the 
use of force. Of course, in counter-terrorist operations, law enforcement and military 
force can act in combination, potentially reducing the level of force necessary. For 
example, law enforcement disruption of a number of terrorist cells within an organization 
may lessen the extent (number, location, etc.) of military strikes that need to be 
conducted. Indeed, such coordination resulted in such an effect following the events of 
September 11 (Schmitt, 2002). However, the ultimate impact of the use of violence, for 
good or ill, remains the same for citizens in the target zone. 
E. THE ISSUE OF PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE  
While easily understood in and of themselves, particularly in their originating, 
historical context of state-on-state warfare, the concepts of necessity, immediacy and 
proportionality become increasingly complicated when applied in the environment of the 




pre-emptive self-defense, or preventative action, is among the most complicated and 
controversial issues in the current, so called global war on terror (Gray, 2004, pp. 159–
194)  
A group of scholars, increasing in number since September 11, have contended 
that the pervasive, global, dispersed, unpredictable nature of the global, terrorist threat, 
combined with such groups’ access to the means of delivering massive casualty, 
conventional strikes, or, even more gravely, weapons of mass destruction, justifies 
preemptive use of force in self-defense. Under this stream of thought, only the preventive 
use of force can truly prevent and deter global, non-state actors who act, essentially, 
without warning, or about whom intelligence is typically fleeting, creating “ticking time 
bomb” situations or windows of limited opportunity to strike before a target disappears, 
or actually attacks (Dinstein, 2005, p. 182). Indeed, the United States has strongly argued 
that “anticipatory” self-defense is justified in response to not only armed attack, but also 
“hostile intent” (United States Government, 2004, p. 75). The United States has argued 
that the “imminent” nature of such threats that justifies the use of force in self-defense 
(Dunlap, n.d., p. 15). Furthermore, and perhaps most remarkably, the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States established a clear policy of preemption, 
particularly when global terrorist actors threaten to use weapons of mass destruction 
(United States Government, 2002). In terms of case law, Judge Schwebel’s dissenting 
opinion in the Nicaragua case contended, citing other scholarly works, which Article 51 
only defined, or enshrined in statute, one traditional mode, or method, of justified self-
defense, in response to an armed attack (Nicaragua, ICJ, 1986). While the accuracy of 
such policy positions and scholarly, legal theory is open to debate, current jus ad bellum 
does not appear to support the notion that jus ad bellum on self-defense against global, 
non-state terror actors justifies preventive force (Gray, 2004, pp. 159–194). 
First, the UN Charter’s authors clearly, specifically intended to use the term 
“armed attack” in Article 51. Indeed, throughout the balance of the UN Charter, the 
broader, more nebulous term “aggression” is used in the context of collective defense, 
regional compacts and even the purposes of the UN. Yet, when asked to define a right to  
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self-defense, the authors explicitly chose the term “armed attack,” which cannot be by 
accident. Thus, to find support for preemption under Art 51, it would be necessary to run 
counter to a facial reading of the UN Charter (Dinstein, 2005, p. 184). 
Second, it is difficult to find true support for preventive self-defense in modern 
custom on jus ad bellum (Gray, 2004, pp. 159–194). The Caroline case, often cited as a 
basis for preemption, or anticipatory self-defense because its facts involved a British 
strike against a boat that was only waiting to be dispatched to deliver arms and personnel, 
is, not in fact, relevant to preemption because the Caroline was, in fact, part of an 
ongoing operation of support (Stevens, 1989). Quite simply, the boat had already been 
and was going to be used in the conflict. Britain was acting to stop an ongoing practice 
and not to forestall an impending American, or rebel, invasion. Furthermore, the main 
predecessor to the UN Charter’s provisions on the prohibition on the use of force with a 
limited exception for self-defense, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, did not establish an 
explicit nor implicit right to preemption. In short, it is difficult to find a modern legal or 
customary tradition for preemption (Dinstein, 2005, pp. 184–185). 
Third, and related to the first argument above, clearly the UN Charter’s authors 
knew how to create a limited right to use force—indeed, for this reason—Article 51 and 
the right to self-defense was created, which, in turn, is itself ultimately subject to UN 
Security Council action (Sharp, 2010, p. 348). Were a right to preemption to have been 
established, little doubt exists that the authors would have explicitly established it and 
placed it under even greater scrutiny and supervision than the inherent right of self-
defense (Dinstein, 2005, p. 185).  
Thus, the conclusion remains that in the end, self-defense, even in the context of 
global, non-state terror actors, requires an armed attack, and is subject to the other major 
factors described previously (Gray, 2004, pp. 159–194). However, while preemption 
itself does not appear justified, a limited right to self-defense may be justified when “the 
bullet is literally being fired but has yet to leave the chamber.”  
Case in point, Israel’s attempts at justifying its 1981 targeted strike against Iraq to 
destroy its nascent nuclear program in terms of preemptive self-defense were inherently 
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flawed because an actual armed attack had not occurred, nor was there necessity, 
immanency nor proportionality (McCormack, pp. 295–302, 1996). In contrast, Israel’s 
1967 Six-Day War fought against the Arab allies was, if not fully, far more legally 
justified. In that case, Israel, observing the blocking of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt, 
Egypt’s ordering of UN peacekeepers out of the Sinai, initial deployments of its troops 
into the Sinai counter to earlier cease fire agreements, and a major buildup of troops 
along its western and eastern borders, proactively invaded its neighbors—the armed 
attack, although yet to cross Israel’s borders, was more than imminent, and was literally 
underway (Maogato, 2005, pp. 34–35). Indeed, neither the UN Security Council nor the 
General Assembly condemned Israel’s actions, although this absence was likely at least 
in part due to the underdog position of Israeli during this period of international history. It 
is worth noting that these same bodies, although passively accepting Israel’s actions, did 
not vote to proclaim or support an actual right to preemptive self-defense (Maogato, 
2005, pp. 34–35). Thus, while the armed attack requirement is clear, limited 
circumstances may exist in which it is evident that the attack itself is underway, and 
interception is legally justified. Such circumstances do appear to be, historically and 
legally, extremely rare and carry a high burden of proof. However, as has begun to be 
observed, and seen further in subsequent chapters, the higher legal and policy goals of the 
general prohibition on the use of force and the limited means by which to justify the 
vesting of a right to self-defense are increasingly challenged by modern threats like 
global, non-state actor terrorist groups. 
Figure 1 provides a basic visualization of the legal regime just reviewed. It 
compares the types of activities that can trigger the various threshold requirements just 
studied, which in turn, can justify the type of legal responses as examined previously 




Figure 1.   The UN Charter Jus and Bellum Framework and Use of Force Analysis 
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Having established the rules on jus ad bellum related to self-defense that focus on 
the question of non-state actors, a review of relevant case law and historical practice 
applying these rules, and demonstrating how they developed, ensues. 
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V. CASE LAW AND HISTORICAL PRACTICE 
A. HISTORICAL EVENTS AND CASE LAW RELEVANT TO THE 
CENTRAL QUESTION 
Having established the tenets of jus ad bellum dealing with self-defense, with a 
focus on the context of use of force in self-defense against global, non-state, terror actors, 
a series of cases and historical incidents relevant to this paper’s central question is now 
briefly examined. While the body of case law on jus ad bellum is relatively large, the 
number of instances involving use of force in professed self-defense against a global, 
non-state terror actor is relatively small, albeit growing. These selections are, therefore, 
meant as exemplary, not comprehensive, to illustrate fully the points made previously. 
They are also intended to show the evolution in jus ad bellum that has occurred to present 
day, influenced by the growing use of force in self-defense by states against state 
supported and non-state actor terrorist groups. 
1. Israeli Action Against PLO Headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, 1985 
In 1985, the Israeli government claimed a right to use force under self-defense 
when it struck the Tunisian headquarters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) (Byers, 2007, p. 62). Israel conducted an airstrike on the headquarters building, 
well within Tunisian territory in the capital of Tunis (Gray, 2004, p. 161). The Israelis 
contended that Tunisia was harboring, supplying and assisting non-state actor terrorists 
who had committed acts of terrorism within Israeli territory, and the building struck 
housed key PLO leadership and operational authorities (Maogato, 2005, p. 112). The UN 
Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 573, condemning the air strike, 
finding no justification for self-defense, and conveying that the attack was, “an act of 
armed aggression…in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
international law and norms of conduct” (S.C. Res. 573, UN SCOR, 1985). The case is 
significant in that, despite the relatively low bar set for attribution of state support seen in 
the Nicaragua case, which demonstrated armed attack, it can be seen that the 
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international community simply refused to attribute past PLO attacks to the Tunisian 
government, nor find necessity and immanence in the PLO’s operational presence in 
Tunisia, no matter the organization’s past attacks in Israel and against Israeli interests 
globally. The concept of accumulation clearly had yet to take hold, and the threat of 
global terrorism had not yet reached a sufficient, apparent level, to make a targeted air 
strike overseas proportional.  
The case is also important, however, because the United States abstained from 
voting on Resolution 573. In doing so, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Vernon Walters 
articulated that, “We… recognize and strongly support the principle that a state subjected 
to continuing terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend 
against further attacks. This is an aspect of the inherent right of self-defense recognized 
in the UN Charter (Maogato, 2005, p. 91). Two months later, then Secretary of State 
George Schultz articulated what would become known as the “Schultz Doctrine.” He 
stated, “It was absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists 
in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other nations, even 
for the purpose of rescuing hostages; or from using force against states that support, train, 
and harbor terrorists or guerillas. International law requires no such result (Maogato, 
2005, p. 91).” Schultz’s argument, and the larger U.S. position, was a critical step in the 
evolution the use of jus ad bellum theory to justify the use of force in self-defense against 
a global, non-state terror actor. While, clearly, the international community was not yet 
willing to adopt, even implicitly, such interpretations of the inherent right of self-defense, 
the arguments represent a growing recognition of the global threat of terrorist groups and 
the need for certain nations to find a larger, more expansive application of the inherent 
right. The Schultz Doctrine was also important because, despite its facially strong, almost 
unilateralist tone, it was, in fact, an appeal to international law and norms to recognize 
and adapt to a real and growing threat. The American position was not one of disregard 
and contempt for the UN Charter, the kind that had 60 years earlier undermined and 
ruined the Kellogg-Briand Pact and League of Nations. Rather, it was an argument 
designed to conform with and shape understanding of Article 51 and the inherent right of 
self-defense. This view is critical, because it represents an ongoing trend in the post-war 
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world to actually justify the use of force under a legally vested right of self-defense. It 
represents, historically, an almost remarkable shift away from the natural rights tradition, 
to a true, legal positivist one. As is often the case in international law, however, the 
realities of state survival predate actual, legal and normative reforms. 
2. UN Reaction to the 1988 Pan Am 103 Bombing, 1992 
In 1992, the Security Council, in a delayed reaction to the 1988 bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103 (the Lockerbie case) and UTA Flight 722 the following year, affirmed the 
right of all states to protect their nationals from acts of international terrorism that 
constitute threats to international peace and security and expressed concern over Libya’s 
failure to cooperate fully in establishing responsibility for the acts in Security Council 
Resolution 748 (Schmitt, 2002). The Lockerbie case, and Resolution 748, although not 
per se involving a non-state terror actor, did mark a fairly remarkable development in the 
evolution of modern jus ad bellum because it declared that terrorism constituted a threat 
to international peace and security (Sharp, 2010, p. 349). This concept, in turn, implicated 
the provisions of the 2(4), more than implying that under the right conditions, an act of 
terrorism could warrant the use of force in self-defense, if not the UN Charter’s collective 
security provisions, or, more likely, a Security Council mandate to use force to preserve 
peace and security. In this case, 748 would lead to a series of sanctions against Qaddafi’s 
regime. That it took four years from the events of 1988 and full-scale investigations is 
testament to what it takes to change the norms of international law and practice on the use 
of force, and also, by the 1990s, the increased recognition of the real threat that 
international terrorism, state sponsored and otherwise, posed to international peace. It 
was a growing recognition that would soon be tested. 
3. United States Response to East Africa Bombings, 1998 
In 1998, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed and destroyed 
by Al Qaeda, which killed 252 people and injured over 5,000 individuals. The UN 
Security Council, in Resolution 1189, condemned the attacks as a threat to international 
peace and security, despite the fact that no clear indication of a state sponsor or direct 
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state support to the attacks existed (Maogato, 2005, p. 113). This condemnation 
confirmed the trend started with 1992’s Resolution 748. Soon thereafter, the United 
States launched cruise missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan to destroy a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical plant allegedly being used to produce chemical weapons, and training 
camps in Afghanistan (Gray, 2004, p. 163). The target of these attacks was Al Qaeda. 
The importance of this full-scale response to the evolution of jus ad bellum in the context 
of self-defense against global, non-state terror actors cannot be understated. The United 
States actively targeted multiple bases of operation, in different countries, of a “stateless 
confederation of terrorist groups, without hierarchy, government or territory (Gellman & 
Priest, 1998).” In addition, while it did so without an actual, explicit UN Security Council 
authorization, it did do so with UN recognition that the original attacks were a threat to 
international peace (Sharp, 2010, p. 352). 
President Clinton, in publically justifying the use of force, cited the imminent 
threat of Al Qaeda posed by the bases struck, and more generally, “the inherent right of 
self-defense consistent with Article 51” (Maogato, 2005, p. 114). Global reaction, to the 
strikes, and their justifications, was mixed. Western European nations generally 
supported the measures. Russia, still reeling from Western intervention and use of force 
in the Balkans expressed outrage at the “indecency” of the measures taken, and the 
Chinese offered a nebulous statement condemning terrorism in general (Maogato, 2005, 
p. 114).  
The events of 1998 affirm the trends established by the Israeli-Tunisian incident 
of 1985. The threat of international terrorism, and condemnation of its mass casualty acts, 
was now clearly recognized by the international community, and quickly affirmed by UN 
resolution (Sharp, 2010, pp. 352–353). The United States continued to argue that a right 
to self-defense had vested given that an armed attack had occurred against its official 
interests abroad, and that a persistent, immediate threat existed that necessitated the use 
force—force that was taken relatively soon after the actual attacks (Gray, 2004, p. 163). 
The use of Tomahawk missiles against select targets appeared to represent a case for 
proportionality—occurring over a limited period of time—attempting to minimize 
collateral damage, not putting actual troops on the ground, while still applied in a volume 
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deemed sufficient to actually stop the immediate threat and deter future attacks. In sum, 
the United States continued to contend that anticipatory use of force in self-defense 
against terrorist groups was justified, and that it would continue to justify, and actually 
use such force, in sync with international law—with one important caveat. While the 
United States would always attempt to justify its actions in terms of international law, the 
Clinton administration made clear that the United States would “not simply play passive 
defense” and “had to be prepared to go on the offensive” (Perl, 1998). The global threat 
of mass casualty attacks against U.S. interests and citizens had combined with the threat 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production and use, in the form of Al Qaeda, 
driving the Clinton administration towards a policy of preemptive, or anticipatory, self-
defense. While Clinton’s policy would remain largely focused on a “law enforcement” 
centric approach to counter-terrorism, the basic framework for future U.S. legal 
arguments justifying the use of force against global, non-state actors had been 
established. 
4. United States and International Response to 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 killed roughly 3,000 people. Their 
scale was without precedent. Their impact and significance for jus ad bellum, and the 
primary question of this paper, is substantial. A full examination of these events and all 
of their surrounding circumstances is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper’s focus 
must be on how jus ad bellum was, or was not, utilized to justify the use of force against 
the attackers following September 11, and how the legal regime described earlier in this 
chapter was utilized, and pushed, to do so. To address this focus, this case is divided into 
three parts, including first, the basic facts of the legal and UN response following 9/11, 
then, second, the question of whether a right of self-defense had vested against Al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan, and finally, third, the matter of whether a right of self-defense had vested 
against the ruling Taliban regime.  
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a. UN Resolutions and U.S. Justifications 
From the outset, the United States declared that the circumstances were 
exceptional, and that it was, essentially, at war. President Bush declared, “Our war on 
terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated (Maogato, 2005, p. 115).” 
While the actual legal actions taken by the United States is reviewed to justify its 
impending use of force in self-defense, it must be recognized at the outset that the Bush 
Administration, whatever its legal arguments, viewed its response to the September 11 
attacks as a larger, global conflict against any and all global, non-state terror groups, 
including, but not ending with, Al Qaeda. Its notion of self-defense, in this context, went 
far beyond the concept of a limited, necessary, immediate, and proportional response to 
an armed attack. Advancing and amplifying the trends started under the Reagan and 
Clinton Administrations, the Bush Administration was openly pursuing a policy of 
military-based counter-terrorism that applied anticipatory, if not preemptive self-defense 
on a scale, scope and duration not seen before. This recognition is critical because the 
United States, its allies, and the UN Security Council, used the legal regime described 
earlier in this chapter, to justify U.S. use of force in Afghanistan (Gray, 2004, pp. 164–
165). As seen in the brief review that follows, U.S. action against Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan was fully supported by jus ad bellum as self-defense against a non-state 
actor. U.S. action against the Taliban in Afghanistan is a far more complicated matter 
and, despite social, political and historical forces may not have actually been justified 
under contemporary jus ad bellum on self-defense against a state-sponsor of terrorism.  
It is, thus, possible to easily begin to understand the incongruities created 
when the application of a legal regime to justify a state’s actions in self-defense, and the 
actual policy goals of that state in applying such force, are not in harmony. For the UN 
and U.S. allies, the use of force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban following 9/11 was a 
legally, and morally, justified act of self-defense to eliminate a clear and immediate 
threat—Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. For the United States, action in Afghanistan was only 
the beginning of what it felt had to be a global, military conflict against all terror 
groups—a global war on terror.  
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As seen, contemporary jus ad bellum on self-defense against non-state 
actors was never designed nor intended to provide a “carte blanche” license to a state to 
seek out any and all enemies, globally, on a preemptive basis. The impact on jus ad 
bellum is still being felt and the degree to which international norms have changed as the 
result of this gap between official legal license and actual use of force, is still being 
determined. These issues, and others impacting and limiting contemporary jus ad bellum 
on self-defense, in the context of global, non-state terror actors, is more fully examined in 
subsequent chapters (Gray, 2004, p. 165). 
What is remarkable, historically, is that almost concurrently with President 
Bush’s declaration, the United Nations Security Council declared a very similar footing, 
with statements, such as the following coming from its members, “The magnitude of the 
acts goes beyond terrorism as we have known it so far… We therefore think that new 
definitions, terms and strategies have to be developed for the new realities (Kuchinsky, 
2001). The UN General Assembly also adopted Resolution 56/1 without a vote, which 
called for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism, and 
stressed that those responsible for aiding terrorists would be held accountable (Maogato, 
2005, p. 115). The Assembly, however, did not evoke the right of self-defense, perhaps 
wary of helping to justify too expansive a use of force against terror groups worldwide 
(Gray, 2004, pp. 165–166). 
On September 12, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368 
condemning the attacks as horrifying and labeled them a threat to international peace and 
security, and reaffirmed the inherent right of self-defense as recognized by the UN 
Charter (Schmitt, 2002). In doing so, the UNSC was maintaining the trend, and 
precedent, set by its earlier resolutions following the East Africa bombings, invoking 2(4) 
and the notion that terrorism can be, and was in this case, an armed attack that threatened 
international peace. Subsequently, Resolution 1373 passed on September 28 and evoked 
the right to self-defense. It presented steps to address terrorism, such as restricting 
terrorist financing, denying safe haven to terrorists, and cooperating in law enforcement 
efforts (Maogato, 2005, pp. 119–122).  
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In addition, as noted earlier, both the NATO Council and OAS also 
brought into play their collective security provisions and found, essentially, that an armed 
attack had occurred. Other major regional organizations, such as the Arab League, also 
condemned the attacks. 
As the United States began to gear up for actual military operations, it 
promptly notified the Security Council that it was acting in individual and collective self-
defense as required by Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the report, the United States 
asserted that it had clear and compelling information that Al Qaeda, supported by the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks and an ongoing threat persisted 
(Gray, 2004, pp. 108–134). That threat, the report argued, was made possible by the 
decision of the Taliban to let parts of Afghanistan, which the regime controlled, to be 
used by Al Qaeda as a base of operations. The purpose of U.S. and allied military 
operations was, therefore, to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States 
(Schmitt, 2002). 
Portentously, the United States gave notice that, “We may find our self-
defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other States.” 
Later, when addressing the nation, President Bush echoed the Article 51 notification and 
stated, “Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If 
any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws 
and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril” 
(Schmitt, 2002). 
It is worth noting that the Security Council never, actually, explicitly 
authorized the United States, or anyone else to use force pursuant to Article 42 of the UN 
Charter, as the Council is entitled to do in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of 
peace or act of aggression (Gray, 2004, pp. 165–167). Of course, as previously seen, 
explicit authorization was not in fact required given a vested right to self-defense. All the 
UN Charter requires is notice when a state finds the inherent right has vested and it is 
going to use force in defense. Twice, the UN Council did explicitly refer to the inherent 
right to individual and collective self-defense prior to the onset of coalition combat 
operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Subsequently, the UN Council made no 
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effort to condemn the forceful response once launched. In fact, it repeatedly reaffirmed 
the right to self-defense and expressed support for the international effort to root out 
terrorism, as those operations were ongoing (Schmitt, 2002). In short, the world more 
than implicitly supported U.S. and allied military action in Afghanistan following 
September 11. If ever there was a case that such use of force was normatively accepted, 
this acceptance was it. 
Thus, throughout this process, when responding to the attacks of 
September 11, the United States actively sought to justify and make legitimate its actions 
using international law and the UN Charter’s security system (Gray, 2004, pp. 165–167), 
which is critical to observe for two reasons. First, once again, notice that the post-war 
prohibition on the use of force and its commitment to legal positivism on use of force was 
upheld. Historically, no small achievement given the fact that the world’s most powerful 
state had just been directly attacked—historically, the basis for out and out declarations 
of war and real politick. Second, that same legal regime was actively utilized to support a 
use of force that was arguably never contemplated when it was created, at once pushing it 
to its limits, while also providing at least an air of legitimacy to states seeking to use 
similar force in the future. Whether this will represent an historical anomaly, a precedent 
setting moment, or both, has yet to be determined. 
b. Use of Force in Self-Defense Against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
After 9/11 
The case for the use of force against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in self-
defense following 9/11 is remarkably straightforward (Gray, 2004, pp. 165–168). Such 
force was a legitimate exercise of the inherent right to self-defense. As seen, that right 
extends to armed attacks from whatever source. The attacks clearly occurred, perhaps the 
most covered news event in history. Their scale was, relatively speaking for a terrorist 
attack, massive, and their effect was highly destructive. Indeed, even accumulation can 
apply to help justify self-defense as 9/11 was certainly not the first time that Al Qaeda 
had struck U.S. interests and citizens (East Africa, USS Cole, and the first World Trade 
Center Bombing). The group was not a U.S. domestic insurgency and its operatives had 
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clearly entered the United States from outside its borders. The targets of the attacks were 
major military and economic centers, as well as the citizenry itself. The group ultimately 
took responsibility for the events, and its ongoing presence in Afghanistan, if not 
globally, was, by 2001, well known to intelligence services worldwide—in short, a strong 
basis for necessity and immanence, in September 2001 (Gray, 2004, pp. 163–168). Also, 
a relatively sound basis existed for finding the resulting use of force proportional, as the 
only real way to prevent and deter a future attack was to unseat completely the group 
from its bases in Afghanistan, which required a sustained assault involving ground forces 
and the taking of territory. Indeed, once the Taliban failed to police the territory it 
controlled, the attacks were necessary and proportionate, and they occurred in the face of 
an imminent, credible continuation of an Al Qaeda campaign underway for years (Sharp, 
2010, pp. 353–356). 
As seen in subsequent chapters, the issue with the application of 
contemporary jus ad bellum on self-defense to Al Qaeda itself was not the legitimacy of 
the original action taken against it in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11, but rather, 
the global scope, massive military scale, and extended duration of the force used by the 
United States and its allies following this initial, vesting of the right (Gray, 2004, pp. 
108–134). In actuality, this use of jus ad bellum raises some of the most important 
questions about the adequacy of contemporary international law on the use force in self-
defense, against global, non-state terrorist groups.  
c. Use of Force in Self-Defense Against the Taliban in Afghanistan 
After 9/11 
The legality and legitimacy of use of force in self-defense against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, following 9/11, is a more a difficult question (Gray, 2004, pp. 
163–168). Facially, it appears obvious that Al Qaeda was operating in Afghanistan with 
the Taliban regime’s knowledge and consent. It also appears obvious that the two groups 
were, politically and philosophically, of a like mind. Moreover, it is also evident that 
following 9/11, despite U.S. warnings and demands, the Taliban took no measures to 
subdue, restrain or otherwise stop Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Yet, in fact, the case is not so 
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clear since it is not evident that the regime was, if ever, in a position to really control Al 
Qaeda, that it was, in fact, actively supporting its operations as much as Al Qaeda was 
supporting the Taliban, or that the Taliban had any sort of effective control over Al 
Qaeda issuing it orders or declaring its policies. In short, the “state” of Afghanistan, as 
governed by the Taliban, was, arguably, more beholden to Al Qaeda, than the opposite 
(Gray, 2004, pp. 166–67). Thus, the jus ad bellum issues revolve around questions of 
state responsibility and sponsorship, particularly in the context of armed bands and 
terrorist groups (Sharp, 2010, pp. 349–353). 
The essential question with respect to the Taliban in this context is 
whether or not they engaged in an armed attack under the law of self-defense through its 
association with Al Qaeda. It is true that principles of state responsibility determine when 
a state may be held responsible for an act, and thus, subject to reparations or 
countermeasures (Schmitt, 2002). However, forcible countermeasures are not an 
acceptable remedy for violations of state responsibility (Schmitt, 2002), whether the issue 
is harboring a terrorist group or being responsible for an act committed by one. Indeed, 
current international law makes acts of retribution and retaliation illegal (O’Connell, 
2008, p.15). However, certain acts that generate state responsibility may at the same time 
justify a violent response under the laws of self-defense. Stated differently, just because 
the Taliban, through their association with Al Qaeda, became an affront to the United 
States and committed an act of negligence, would not justify an act of revenge against the 
regime. Instead, the principles of self-defense must apply for force to be justified (Sharp, 
2010, pp. 349–353). 
Was the Taliban-Al Qaeda association such that an armed attack was 
attributable to the Taliban? As seen earlier, the rules on what constitutes actual state 
sponsorship of a terrorist group are hardly bright line—indeed, they are more a “know it 
when you see it” standard (Sharp, 2010, p. 350). However, on 9/11, the accepted legal 
standard came from the Nicaragua case, which, though unclear, did create a high 
standard for finding state responsibility for the actions of a non-state actor for an armed 
attack (O’Connell, 2008, p. 254). 
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In Nicaragua, Nicaragua argued that the United States was responsible for 
violations of humanitarian law committed by the Contras, the anti-Sandinista rebel group 
it supported. The ICJ found that it could not attribute the Contra’s actions to the United 
States in the course of its military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. The ICJ found 
that for its conduct to give rise to legal responsibility, the United States would had to 
have maintained effective control of the Contras, instead of merely aiding them through 
supplies and training. Thus, while the United States had a degree of state responsibility 
for the Contras, it had not committed an armed attack, and thus, had not violated jus ad 
bellum (O’Connell, 2008, p. 254). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that an armed attack must be 
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across a border, but 
also the sending by, or on behalf of, a state of armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries that 
use force against the victim state similar to what regular forces would otherwise achieve 
(O’Connell, 2008, p. 254). The “controlling” state has to be so substantially involved in 
the operation that it would amount to an armed attack if conducted by regular members of 
its own, standing armed forces. In sum, the state has to have, at minimum, significant, if 
not determinative, influence over the group’s decision making, and have a meaningful, 
operational role in the specific actions in question to attribute an armed attack (Schmitt, 
2002). 
The Taliban’s failure to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for 
Al Qaeda did not in and of itself justify use of force against the Taliban (Sharp, 2010, p. 
351). Little evidence exists that Al Qaeda was under the direction or control of the 
Taliban in conducting the 9/11 attacks or any other acts of international terrorism—
certainly not sufficient to meet Nicaragua’s requirements for attribution. In fact, in many 
ways, it appears the Taliban were actually dependent on Al Qaeda for money and military 
support.  
Furthermore, the level of Taliban support fell below that of the Iranian 
government in the Embassy case (ICJ, Tehran, 1980). The regime did not publically 
support the attacks, and it never assumed control of the terrorist campaign in a way  
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similar to how the Iranian regime took effective control over the release of the U.S. 
hostages. Further, Taliban military operations against the United States only began after 
the onset of U.S. and coalition forces’ military action. 
Equally, little evidence exists that the Taliban actually ordered Al Qaeda 
to strike specific targets or provided the kind of material and logistical support that the 
United States had to the Contras, as cited by the Nicaragua Court as potential evidence of 
contributing to an armed attack. What the Taliban did do was grant Al Qaeda a base of 
operations that it was free to use as it saw fit (Sharp, 2010, p. 351). As Nicaragua states, 
an armed attack cannot be attributed to a state through the harboring of terrorists alone—
no matter how likeminded and in harmony the state and group may be.  
Following 9/11 and before it began its use of force, the United States 
demanded that the Taliban turn over Al Qaeda leaders and that the United States be 
permitted to confirm the end of Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan (Sharp, 2010, p. 
351). Of course, the Taliban failed to comply. At this point, a U.S. right to enter 
Afghanistan for the defined purpose of eliminating Al Qaeda operations and their threat 
clearly vested. It remains quite unclear that a right to strike at and eliminate the Taliban 
regime itself, in essence, to conquer Afghanistan, had also been secured. Nonetheless, no 
international opposition to the use of military force to remove the Taliban regime and to 
conquer Afghanistan in the process occurred.  
It is critical to note that these comments are not made in any context other 
than a legal one. Socially, morally, and politically, the Taliban was an abhorrent regime 
that oppressed its population and whose negligence clearly contributed to the terrible 
results of the 9/11 attacks, if not other acts of terrorism. However, the troubling 
implications for respect for state sovereignty and the bounds of the use of force in self-
defense remain, despite the reprehensible nature of the Taliban regime itself. It is 
definitely not possible to ignore the reality that jus ad bellum was actively used to justify 
the overthrow of a regime, when it is unclear that international law and norms actually 
supported such force. That international political will, following the outpouring of 
support for the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 accepted and supported such force, 
cannot make up for the impact of such precedents on the future use of the Article 51 
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system. Indeed, when taken in combination with the clear intentions of the United States 
to find similar legal justifications in jus ad bellum for future preemptive actions against 
Al Qaeda and other terror groups worldwide, it is thus possible to begin to appreciate 
fully the serious implications of post-9/11 use of jus ad bellum to support use of force in 
self-defense against Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, in Afghanistan. Subsequent chapters 
more fully explore such consequences. 
5. Israeli and United States Targeted Killings with Precision Weapons, 
Late 2000s 
A final exemplary case relevant to this paper’s central question involves U.S. and 
Israeli use of precision munitions, and often unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver 
them, to strike at very specific terrorist targets. Increasingly, such strikes have become a 
preferred method of self-defense force because they can be brought to bear very quickly, 
with minimal notice, capitalizing on the latest intelligence, in theory limit the prospect of 
collateral damage, place home troops and citizens in minimal danger, and create minimal 
violation of another state’s territory (Wittes, 2009). In theory, this method of force 
presents certain, significant advantages in terms of jus ad bellum on self-defense against a 
global, non-state terror actor—keeping defensive force proportional, very responsive to 
an imminent threat, with global reach, and used only when a substantiated threat exists. 
In reality, application of this method of force in self-defense presents significant issues 
for the normative limits of self-defense, the definition of armed attack, and for state 
sovereignty. 
As seen, the United States has, arguably since Caroline, and certainly since the 
mid-1980s, attempted to at once justify its use of force in terms of the UN Charter’s 
Article 51 inherent right provisions, while also contending that a state has a right to 
anticipatory, or preemptive, self-defense when a threat is real and imminent. It has 
definitely applied such arguments in the context of global, non-state terrorist threats. 
Most recently, it has pursued the extensive use of targeted missile strikes from UAV 
drones in places including Yemen, Somalia, and South Waziristan (Pakistani Federal 
Territories) (Wittes, 2009). Politically, such strikes make sense for the United States 
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because it allows it to strike at a moment’s notice, anywhere in the world, capitalizing on 
the latest intelligence, allowing it to keep up true pressure on terrorist groups while 
minimizing jus ad bello issues like collateral damage, and appearing, at home, to be 
actively pursuing the enemy, while putting U.S. troops in minimal danger. To justify the 
use of this type of force, the United States has turned to self-defense law and norms.  
Indeed, the 9/11 Commission reported that the Clinton administration had legally 
justified an ultimately aborted, targeted strike to kill Osama Bin Laden, on the basis that 
he was an imminent threat to the United States by invoking the imminence standard. In 
broader terms, successive U.S. administrations, including, arguably, the present Obama 
administration more than any preceding one, have taken the view that targeted killings 
are wholly justified in terms of self-defense because the United States is engaged in a 
real, long term conflict with groups like Al Qaeda and that for armed attack, immanence 
and necessity requirements are satisfied thanks to the ongoing campaign of such groups 
against U.S. interests. Furthermore, proportionality is satisfied in that the use of force is 
“surgical” and well adapted to the nature of a terrorist group—kill the leaders, destroy a 
cell, damage the group’s infrastructure—all legitimate aims in an ongoing, armed 
conflict. Indeed, Hays Parks presented this basic U.S. conception of self-defense as early 
as 1989 in a Department of Defense memorandum, in which it was contend that three 
basic types of self-defense exist, including defense against an actual armed attack, 
preemptive self-defense against an imminent threat, and self-defense against a continuing 
threat (Wittes, 2009, pp. 366–370). In practice, in the global war on terror, the United 
States has also capitalized on fairly broad, international acceptance of its use of force in 
pursuit of Al Qaeda following 9/11. Thus, once again, the commitment of the United 
States is used to justify its use of force in self-defense-legal terms, even in the case of 
targeted killings, its intent, however, to remain flexible and pragmatic in its use of self-
defense law and practice, and, in candid terms, its willingness to accept that sometimes 
its use of force will be accepted, internationally, and other terms, a diplomatic cost will 
have to be paid to protect its security interests. 
The difficulty of this position is that legally, as already seen, it is hardly obvious 
that the necessity and imminence requirements allow for the kind of long-term view of 
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legitimate self-defense that the United States favors, particularly in the context of a 
global, non-state terrorist actor. Such groups are not engaged with the United States in 
classic, state on state, WWII style military conflict. Its use of force is sudden and 
temporally limited from case to case, which occurs in a wide array of locations, globally. 
While collectively constituting a campaign, perhaps triggering accumulation, it is simply 
not clear that even such a campaign permits targeted killings, essentially at will, when 
intelligence identifies the location of a target. In addition, that such groups are not state 
actors, and take refuge in third-party states, raises issues of state consent and sovereignty, 
particularly when it is difficult to establish state support for armed attacks, requiring the 
Nicaragua standard of effective control—a high bar indeed. Thus, without consent from 
states like Pakistan, it is not readily apparent how targeted killings occurring in a third-
party state are fully, legally justified (Murphy, 2009). 
What happens, then, when U.S. use of targeted killings in self-defense, meets the 
international community’s far narrower concept of self-defense? What happens when the 
United States begins to use targeted killings against non-Al Qaeda targets that lack the 
implicit support of international good will following 9/11 and the explicit support of UN 
Security Council resolutions? In addition, perhaps most importantly for the meaning of 
jus ad bellum, what happens when states like Turkey want to use drone strikes to kill 
Kurdish group leaders in Northern Iraq, or Colombia’s military wants to routinely 
assassinate FARC leaders in Ecuador, or the government of Congo wants to strike at 
targets in Uganda from which raids are launched (Murphy, 2009)? The Israeli experience 
with targeted killings is useful to understand the more likely, normative, legal and 
diplomatic limits of such use of force in self-defense. 
6. Israel 
The State of Israel has at times utilized targeted killings as part of a spectrum of 
methods of force in its counter-terrorism efforts. Israel does not prefer to use targeted 
killings because, first and foremost, it prefers the arrest of terrorist group leaders to reap 
the intelligence gains that typically result from capture. In fact, between 2000 and 2005, 
the ratio of terror suspects arrested to terrorists targeted for killing was 45 to 1 (Morag, 
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2011). In addition, it prefers to avoid the potential collateral damage that can result for 
civilians who simply happen to be in the way of a terrorist, or who are placed in the way 
intentionally by such leaders. Finally, targeted killings are used sparingly to prevent 
paying the moral, political, and social costs that can result from what are, essentially, 
extra-judicial murders in the form of international condemnation and disruption of peace 
negotiations. Nonetheless, at times, the opportunity to strike at a high value target that 
has and will continue to pose a serious and immediate threat to Israeli territory and 
citizens cannot be avoided. Indeed, targeted killings have been shown to correlate with 
reductions in overall terrorist activity due to their organizational disruptive and deterrent 
effect (Morag, 2011).  
For the Israeli government, the use of targeted killings is a matter of self-defense; 
that position has been contested, both in the realm of international diplomacy and in the 
Israeli judicial system. In 2004, Israeli used a targeted missile strike to kill wheelchair 
bound Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, leader of Hamas, as he was leaving a Mosque (Byers, 
2007, pp. 68–72). His successor was then killed in a similar attack one month later. 
Perhaps no use of force has resulted in a clearer, more exemplary case of the challenge 
that use of force against global, non-state terror actors presents for jus ad bellum on self-
defense. The United States supported the Israeli position that the strikes were an act of 
state self-defense. The men killed were leaders of a terrorist group who had essentially 
admitted to and promised future use of mass casualty acts against Israeli interests and 
citizens as part of an ongoing-armed conflict, and thus, establishing armed attack, 
necessity and immanency. Furthermore, the Israeli, U.S. backed, argument felt that 
Hamas was based in territory outside Israeli borders, on land that had, effectively, never 
belonged to any state, having only been occupied in modern times, thus establishing 
“externality” as opposed to Hamas being a sort of domestic insurgency, or qualifying for 
protections under the Geneva Convention as an independent state. 
For those opposed to targeted killings, the Hamas assassinations were a breach of 
jus ad bello, or the law and custom of armed conflict. In short, their killing was a breach 
of the Geneva Conventions and a denial of due process (Byers, 2007, pp. 68–72). 
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Despite Israeli precautions and attempts at avoiding collateral damage, the debate 
and controversy over the use of targeted killings persisted, arguably culminating in a 
2005 decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice in the case of The Public Committee 
against Torture in Israel vs. The Government of Israel (HCJ 769/02, 2005). The Israeli 
High Court decided the case not only in terms of Israeli law, but also directly in terms of 
international law and custom on armed conflict. Much of the resulting decision is most 
relevant to questions of jus ad bello and the distinction between combatants and civilians 
in the context of terror groups and their hostilities—in short, only combatants and 
civilians exist, no unarmed combatants. Terrorists are not combatants, they are civilians, 
but when they engage in hostilities, they forego the protections afforded civilians under 
law. An individual engages in hostilities when planning, conducting and recovering from 
acts of terrorism. When not engaged in such activities, said individual has the protections 
of a civilian. The Israeli High Court recognized that a spectrum between a true civilian 
and a person who is constantly in the revolving door of terrorist acts exists, and that, 
consequently, a real grey zone exists in most cases when determining when a civilian is 
in fact engaged in hostilities. 
For purposes of this paper’s central examination, the case also does offer a few 
key points relevant to how and when targeted killings may be justified under the law of 
self-defense. First, the Israeli High Court found that the conflict between Israel and the 
terror groups it targeted was an international one, subject to international law and custom 
on armed conflict, and not a domestic, law-enforcement effort. Second, the Israeli High 
Court found that it is impossible to determine ahead of time whether every targeted 
killing is in fact, legally permissible or prohibited, under international law and custom—a 
bright-line rule on the issue is impossible and each case must be reviewed on its own 
facts, sometimes, even retroactively.  
To this end, the Israeli High Court laid out four key steps that must be followed 
before and after any targeted killing, including the following. First, well-based, strong, 
convincing and well-verified information is needed before determining a person is a 
target to avoid striking an innocent person. Second, a civilian directly participating in 
hostilities cannot be attacked if a less harmful means can be employed, such as arrest, 
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interrogation and trial, since terrorists remain civilians who never relinquish their human 
rights. Further, harm can only go so far as is necessary to achieve security, e.g., an entire 
building of innocents cannot be destroyed to kill one person in the planning stage of an 
attack. This example is based on an actual event, in which Hamas military chief Salah 
Shehada was killed using an aerial bomb that created significant collateral loss of life, 
which resulted from an intelligence gap that showed, incorrectly, that surrounding 
buildings in Gaza were empty (Byman & Dicter, 2006, p. 9). Third, after an attack on a 
civilian suspected of taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a thorough, 
independent investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and 
the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed (retroactively). Fourth, every 
effort must be made to minimize harm to innocent civilians. Harm to innocent civilians 
caused during military attacks (collateral damage) must be proportional. In other words, 
attacks should be conducted only if the expected harm to innocent civilians is not 
disproportional to the military advantage to be achieved by the attack. In sum, a 
meticulous examination of every case is required (Jewish Virtual Library, 2006). 
Israeli targeted killing policy has adapted to these requirements, as well as the 
realities of international and domestic political pressure to balance security with human 
rights. All targeted killings require the approval of the Prime Minister and a very select, 
prioritized target list is maintained of only the most “arch” terrorists (Morag, 2011). The 
Israeli military also goes to great lengths to maintain professionalism and not become a 
hit squad, routinely foregoing actionable intelligence due to concerns for collateral loss of 
life (Byman & Dicter, 2006, p. 9). Efforts have also been made to ensure the relative 
transparency of this process by clarifying to the Israeli public and the world how and why 
Israel engages in targeted killings to create both a sense of accountability, as well as 
realistic expectations on what such force can and cannot achieve (Morag, 2011). 
Clearly, considerable debate remains over whether even these extensive, Israeli 
conditions on use of targeted killings justify this use of force as self-defense. However, 
the lessons of this Israeli practice are very instructive for this paper’s examination of the 
limits of jus ad bellum on self-defense, against a global, non-state terror actor. Like the 
United States, Israel strives to use force in compliance with the obligations of 
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international law and custom. It has modified its practices not only due to domestic 
concerns over targeted killings practice, but also, to some degree, the force of 
international opinion—in essence, the force of international custom on the bounds of use 
of force in self-defense. Of course, faced with realities, Israel also retains a degree of 
pragmatic flexibility in dealing with what it its own High Court has deemed an ongoing, 
armed conflict. Nonetheless, it has retained a right to use targeted killings as a means of 
self-defense, while creating what is a fairly transparent process, with a relatively high 
level due process and evidence requirements. 
B. KEY ISSUES FOR ANALYSIS 
Having completed a brief review of contemporary jus ad bellum on self-defense, 
with particular attention to issues related to global, non-state terror actors, it is possible to 
identify a set of key issues that require additional analysis to understand fully the 
limitations of jus ad bellum when confronting the problem of global, non-state terror 
actors. By analyzing these issues, it is possible to gain a more thorough understanding of 
the limitations of modern jus ad bellum when confronting groups like Al Qaeda and 
potentially identify ways in which international law will have to reform to effectively 
adapt to this threat. Three groups of issues are discernable from the previous legal review, 
including the following issues of: shifts in historical context, evolution of the nature of 
the use of force, and changing norms of sovereignty. Within each of these three groups, a 
set of critical sub-issues can be identified. Table 1 summarizes the groups and their 
respective sub-issues in terms of the questions they present for further examination. The 













Issue Area Sub-Issues 
Historical Context 
To what degree is the original intent of the general prohibition 
on the use of force being eroded by a shift toward more regular 
use of force in self-defense, particularly because of the pursuit 
of global, non-state terror actors? 
Evolution of Use of 
Force 
To what degree are the varying scope, scale and duration of use 
force against global, non-state terror groups affecting traditional 
norms of self-defense including the principles of armed attack, 
necessity, immanence, and proportionality? 
Changing Norms of 
Sovereignty 
How are norms of sovereignty affected when the force required 
for use against groups like Al Qaeda must be applied globally, 
across borders, often with minimal, or no warning, in states 
possessing no effective control over such groups? 
Table 1.   Description of Issue Areas and Sub-Issues 
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VI. ANALYSIS—SHIFTS OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. OVERVIEW 
Having reviewed the international law and custom that currently governs the use 
of force in self-defense, with focus on its application to non-state terrorist groups, next is 
an analysis of three overarching factors that appear to be pushing this area of law’s limits 
and forcing its evolution. The first such factor includes changes in historical context, 
from the origination of current legal regime, to the present day. The central question 
essential to analyze, under this factor, is the degree to which the original intent of the 
general prohibition on the use of force is being eroded by a shift toward more regular use 
of force in self-defense, particularly as a result of the pursuit of non-state terror actors. 
B. HISTORICAL ORIGINS 
To begin, the origins of the UN Charter’s provisions on the use of force, its 
original assumptions and intentions are briefly examined. As observed in the previous 
rules chapter, arts. 2(4), 421 and 43 were intended to, in a perfect world, to ensure that no 
state would ever again use force against another, and even if one did, the collective 
security provisions of this “new world order” would quickly and overwhelmingly subdue 
such aggression (Franck, 2002, pp. 2–5). Yet, even in 1945, clearly, the UN Charter’s 
founders had doubts that the general prohibition would always be followed, if ever. Thus, 
the UN Charter’s provisions in Article 51, which has already been reviewed in detail, and 
Article 106, which provides for so called “transitional security arrangements” amongst 
the permanent members of the Security Council that permits the permanent members to 
act together to maintain international peace and security until the Security Council itself 
could act to restore order.  
Thus, a two-tier structure of security is envisioned in the UN Charter. The first 
tier includes the general prohibition, which, if broken, would be met by collective 
security action, or, a transitional security operation organized by the permanent Security  
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Council members. The second tier includes Article 51, and the intent that unilateral, self-
defense occur only until the UN Council can act to restore order, and only following an 
armed attack (Franck, 2002, pp. 2–5). 
Indeed, with the end of WWII, the UN Charter’s drafters, observing the lessons of 
the failed League of Nations and its failure to prevent state-on-state violence, wanted to 
establish a much clearer and stronger commitment to international peace. That said, they 
also knew that preservation of order would require establishment of a clear right to 
defend one’s state when faced with an aggressor, such as Nazi Germany. Although 
perhaps appearing, facially, in opposition, in reality, these two concepts were not. The 
inter-war period demonstrated the fact that the international community required a clear, 
firm commitment to peace enforced by the world’s principle powers, but that states, any 
state, had to have a definitive right to defend themselves, and not be a pawn in games of 
real politick (e.g., Poland or Czechoslovakia). What could not have been expected, during 
the drafting, was just how quickly the necessary commitment to collective security would 
unravel, turning an intended, limited exception, into a global norm. 
Article 51’s origins can thus be seen as a balancing act between the interests of 
major powers and those of lesser states. The debate centered on whether assistance to 
states under attack should be made mandatory or voluntary—whether the Security 
Council should play a case-by-case, political decision-making role in security decisions, 
or force against aggression should be essentially automatic (Franck, 2002, p. 46). The 
resulting compromise is fairly clear from the text itself—a universal commitment to 
international peace would exist in the form of an accepted, general prohibition on the use 
of force, but the authorization of an actual, collective security action would be subject to 
the decision making process of the Security Council itself. Consequently, the only way to 
assure all UN member states of their rights, was to create a limited exception to the 
general prohibition, so that states could be guaranteed the right to look after themselves 
without a mandatory collective security action that could drive the whole world into war, 
if followed strictly (Franck, 2002, p. 48). The concern, of course, was to limit this right so 
that unilateral use of force did not again, become a norm in international affairs. Thus, 
Article 51’s provisions requiring that an armed attack occur and that self-defense force 
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only continue to such time as the Security Council had taken action. The strength of this 
balance was that all states could now be assured a clear right to defend themselves, even 
if under limited circumstances. The downside was that no clear definition of armed attack 
was provided (despite Chinese attempts at offering one), and ultimate resolution of armed 
conflict between states was left to an inherently politicized, Security Council. 
This vision of global security and order, of course, soon gave way to its historical 
contemporary context. Four elements, of the late 1940s and early 1950s, were critical to 
shaping jus ad bellum until recent times. First, the Cold War soon became a reality, thus 
freezing the Security Council’s inherently political process, and all but eliminating a 
functioning collective security system or the prospect of any transitional security 
arrangements. Second was the increased use of proxy war, during the Cold War, to 
pursue states’ interests—supporting one side over others in civil wars, fostering 
insurgencies, and otherwise meddling, through rebels and mercenaries, in the affairs of 
other states, without the actual, direct application of a state’s own forces. As seen, such 
warfare resulted in the Nicaragua case and its points on effective control and just how far 
a state must take control of a rebel group for its actions to constitute armed attack. Third 
were advancements in military technology, in particular, global delivery systems for 
nuclear weapons and the advent of “mutually assured destruction.” In a world in which 
the power to literally destroy another country could be launched instantaneously and 
delivered in less than an hour, the notion of awaiting an armed attack before pursuing the 
inherent right of self-defense became, almost, absurd. Thus, the growth of arguments of 
anticipatory self-defense during the Cold War, which, in turn, also led to absurd 
conclusions—if any state had a right to launch its missiles at any time to protect itself 
from annihilation, and such launch would result in its destruction, the general prohibition, 
and the meaning of a limited exception for self-defense, were made irrelevant (Franck, 
2002, pp. 2–5). Fourth was the trend of globalization, and specifically, a rising global 
consciousness of the notion of universal human rights, civil, economic and otherwise. 
The UN Charter’s provisions on force deal, primarily, with state-on-state conflict, which 
was natural following a half-century of global warfare involving nation-states. However,  
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this emphasis on regulating state conflict arguably relegated issues of human rights 
violations, genocide, indiscriminate use of WMD, and other “global” or “non-state-
based” security issues, to the periphery.  
C. HISTORICAL SHIFT 
So long as the Cold War’s bi-polar balance of powers dynamic was maintained, 
jus ad bellum, under the UN Charter’s provisions, could effectively account for state-on-
state conflict and, through the creation of “legal illusions,” as evidenced in the Nicaragua 
case, tolerate proxy wars without creating a rise to the level of state-on-state conflict. 
However, as non-state conflict became an increasing norm, particularly in the form of 
state supported, and non-state actor terrorism, modern jus ad bellum, and the meaning of 
the self-defense exception, became increasingly challenged. 
This trend can be observed toward increased, international acceptance of use of 
force in self-defense against extra-territorial terrorist threats, and the resulting challenges 
to jus ad bellum, by reviewing a series of historical examples. This review pays particular 
attention to how such use of force was received by the international community in an 
attempt to find evidence of shifts in custom and practice. 
After 50 Americans were injured and two killed in the La Belle Disco attacks, the 
United States attacked Libya with a series of air strikes (Gray, 2002, pp. 161–162). 
Before the attacks, Qadhafi repeatedly threatened that the Libyans could export terrorism 
to America. Despite Libya’s public support of terrorism, international reaction was 
negative. Many of the U.S.’s closest allies were critical. The UN General Assembly 
passed a resolution condemning the action, while Secretary General Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar deplored the state-on-state conflict.  
This reaction was not surprising under the context of international security at the 
time. Nicaragua set a very high bar for assigning rebel actions to their state sponsors or 
for finding assistance to a rebel group constituted an armed attack that validated a victim 
state’s response, which was a very practical approach. The superpowers of the day were 
going to engage in such activity regardless of norms. As a result, a legal fiction was 
created that states otherwise clearly party to a conflict were not, which resulted from the 
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reality of the Cold War—if state sponsorship of terrorism demonstrated an armed attack 
validating a response in self-defense, then the risk of a direct superpower conflict became 
heightened. As to be seen, this understanding of the limits of self-defense and whether 
terrorism could be accepted as an armed attack would change significantly with the end 
of the Cold War. 
During the mid-1990s, Iran routinely invoked Article 51 to justify the use of force 
against bases of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) on Iraqi territory. Similarly, 
Iran routinely pursued incursions into Iraqi territory to pursue Kurdish armed bands. 
Almost no proof exists that that the MKO or Kurdish insurgents were under the effective 
control of the Iraqi government. Despite Iraqi condemnation, the international community 
did not denounce this use of force (Tams, 2009). 
In 1993, a plot to assassinate former President George Bush during a visit to 
Kuwait was foiled with strong evidence of Iraqi government sponsorship. The United 
States launched cruise missiles against Iraqi intelligence facilities in response (Gray, 
2002, p. 162). As discussed earlier, President Clinton justified the actions in terms of self-
defense, and maintained that the use of force was meant to be proportional and eliminate 
Iraq’s capacity to pose a threat. The international community generally supported the 
strikes, implicitly and explicitly, with the Chinese expressing concern, but clear support 
from the United Kingdom, Israel, Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan and South Korea, as well 
as the three Islamic states then sitting on the Security Council: Pakistan, Djibouti and 
Morocco. Egypt, Jordan and Iran criticized the attack, but based on the civilian casualties 
caused. 
The U.S. response was, in reality, questionable as a legitimate act of self-defense. 
The plot in question was already foiled and some of those responsible were already 
incarcerated. Also, no evidence existed of a continuing campaign of terrorism. Even more 
curiously, the Security Council appeared more interested in the facts of the case and 
found Iraqi involvement to be clear (Gray, 2002, p. 162). 
Further evidence of the trend came in 1998 in response to the bombings of the 
U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The previous chapter described the facts of 
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this case. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Russia and Yemen condemned the response. 
Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom supported them. 
Clearly, backing or censure tracked with alignment of political and strategic interests 
with the United States. Reaction to the strikes in Sudan differed significantly from those 
in Afghanistan as well. The League of Arab states condemned the strikes against the 
Sudanese pharmaceutical factory, but not those against the bases in Afghanistan. The 
group of African states, Islamic states and the League of Arab states each requested that 
the Security Council review the attacks against the pharmaceutical plant, but not the 
strikes in Afghanistan. 
The difference is best explained by the degree to which “the facts” ultimately 
supported the different U.S. actions. The United States never really made a clear case that 
the Sudanese plant was producing WMD. In addition, the actual connection between the 
plant and the attacks against the embassies was tangential. In contrast, no doubt existed 
that terrorists were operating from bases in Afghanistan with the acceptance of the 
Taliban regime and that Al Qaeda was connected to the original bombings. The issue, 
from the perspective of international norms on justifiable use of self-defense, was 
whether the United States had adequate evidence to justify its choice of target given the 
original, offending armed attack and the prospect for an ongoing campaign of terror.  
In 2000, 2004 and 2007, Russia argued a right to respond extraterritorially to 
Islamic terrorists. In 2007, responding to attacks by Chechen rebels, it sent air strikes 
against Chechen bases in the Pankisi Gorge. Russia argued that Georgia had been unable 
to establish a security zone in the area of the Russian-Georgian border, continued to 
ignore Security Council Resolution 1373 and would not, or could not, put an end to the 
persistent, cross-border raids. International reactions were mixed, but, once again, no 
major condemnation ensued (Tams, 2009). 
Finally, in March 2008, Colombian forces entered Ecuadorian territory to pursue 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) rebels, considered a terrorist organization by the government of 
Columbia. The OAS denounced the action as a violation of Ecuador’s sovereignty, yet, 
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other international organizations were largely silent and the United States expressed 
direct support for the use of force (Tams, 2009). 
The apparent trend toward an expanded, facts-based concept of self-defense, 
particularly, against non-state actors, is evidenced by evolving case law. Case in point, 
the ICJ, in 2004, seemed willing to defend the traditional, more restrictive interpretation 
of the inherent right of self-defense. In the Israeli Wall case, it observed that Article 51 
clearly states an inherent right of self-defense exists in the case of armed attack by one 
state against another state, and thus, did not justify Israeli measures aimed at preventing 
attacks by terrorists operating from within the occupied territories (Legal Consequences, 
2004).  
Yet, one year later in 2005, the ICJ’s majority was far more equivocal. It rejected 
Uganda’s reliance on self-defense as a response to armed attacks by a rebel movement 
operating from within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), since these could 
not be attributed to the DRC. However, the ICJ then expressly left open the question 
“whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides for a right 
of self-defense against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.” Individual judges 
criticized both pronouncements. Predictably, a number of judges were not convinced by 
the majority’s (lack of) reasoning in the Israeli Wall opinion and drew attention to the 
more recent practice. More importantly, Judges Buergenthal, Kooijmans, and Simma 
expressly accepted that self-defense was available against armed attacks “even if [these 
attacks] cannot be attributed to the territorial State” in the Uganda case (Tams, 2009). 
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HISTORICAL SHIFT 
What then is the historical relationship between the apparently increasing 
numbers of incidents, over time, involving invocation of the self-defense exception 
against terrorist groups, state-sponsored and non-state, to the evolution of jus ad bellum? 
The U.S. military response to the September 11 attacks has no doubt pushed U.S. 
understanding of international law regarding the use of force and the UN Charter’s 
general prohibition on the use of force. Yet, as seen, as dramatic and impactful these 
events, and the military response to them were, they, and their impact on international 
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law, must be seen as part of a larger, historical trend toward an expanded, accepted 
definition of self-defense, tied directly to the rise of non-state terror actors as a global 
threat. Indeed, the events of the past 50 years are more likely to prove part of a regular, 
ongoing evolution in the global community’s understanding of jus ad bellum—adapting 
to new global contexts.  
As seen previously, observing changes in the historical context in which use of 
force norms operate, help demonstrate the “normative drift” of international law and 
practice. Following WWII, the world adopted an understandable desire for collective 
remedies to threats to peace and security—hence the United Nations, its general 
prohibition, and limited exception for self-defense. The Cold War rendered the original 
intent, and design of that system, unattainable and impotent. States thus engaged in self-
help to ensure their security—where the Security Council had originally been hoped to 
operate. With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council was reenergized as the bi-
polar, stifling effects of superpower conflict ended—the UN Council’s permanent 
members were no longer guaranteed to stand in opposite corners on every issue. The UN 
Council could assume, at least in part, more of its aspired role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In addition, indeed, the UN Council did so, authorizing 
the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and multiple peace enforcement operations. In addition, the 
Cold War’s limitations on the unilateral use of force were also relieved, as the prospect of 
proxy war erupting into global war, receded. States today are thus more willing to take 
advantage of, and accept, unilateral uses of force, as fewer “spill over” effects occur. As 
seen in this paper’s historical review, international law is as much a function of shifts in 
internationally accepted practice, and historical and geopolitical context, as it is the literal 
text of treaties and charters.  
Such changes have clearly shifted U.S. understanding of international law 
regarding responses of self-defense to terrorism. As the Nicaragua case showed, during 
the Cold War, guerilla warfare, wrapped up in proxy conflict, constituted the most serious 
issue of use of force outside the classic state-on-state dynamic. Each superpower had its 
clients, including states or rebels. The reason for the general acceptance of such 
“surrogate” conflict was its ability to limit the potential for outright, superpower conflict. 
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Needless to say, the past 20 years have brought dramatic change. Today, only one 
superpower exists. The prospect of open conflict between the United States and states 
like Russia and China appears minimal for at least a generation. Yet, while the prospect 
of formal, state-on-state conflict, as originally contemplated by the UN Charter’s system, 
has gone down, the relative significance, and cause for conflict, of the terrorist threat, has 
grown. Today, international security is dominated by questions of regional instability, 
failed states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the often global, 
decentralized threat of non-state terrorist groups that now operate not as proxies, but 
more often, as independent actors in the international arena in their own right. These are 
precisely the kinds of threats relegated to the fringe of the UN Charter’s security 
system—at least as it was originally intended. This apparent gap has arguably forced U.S. 
understanding of jus ad bellum to change more than any other historical factor, in no 
small part because of increased use of self-defense law and practice against non-state 
terrorist groups.  
At no point has the shift in historical context been more evident than when U.S. 
and British forces invaded and conquered Afghanistan in response to the events of 
September 11. They did so with global acceptance and UN approval. Indeed, the issue of 
the lawfulness of the U.S. and UK actions were never truly challenged, at least not 
formally at the UN or by a major government. In fact, much of the world tried to join the 
cause. Such global acceptance and support was, as observed, part of a post-Cold War 
trend toward increased acceptance of use of force in self-defense against non-state terror 
groups. What is the impact and significance, however, of this historical shift?  
E. KEY OBSERVATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
Based on this paper’s review of shifts in historical context surrounding 
contemporary jus ad bellum on self-defense against non-state terrorist groups, it does 
appear that the UN Charter regime has been re-adjusted, so as to permit forcible 
responses to non-state terrorist groups under more lenient conditions. A series of key 
observations reveal the implications of this shift in historical context.  
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First, the modern notion of self-defense has shifted significantly from its historical 
origins. Its original conception in 1946 was based on state-on-state conflict, as a limited 
exception to a strong, general prohibition that would ultimately be regulated or limited, 
by the Security Council and collective security. Today, self-defense is based on an 
expanded range of threats, including non-state terrorist actors and operates as a larger 
exception, to a still accepted general prohibition on the use of force. 
Indeed, practice since 1989 makes it abundantly clear that acts of terrorism can 
amount to threats to peace in the sense of Article 39 UNC, and, as earlier observed, 
constitute armed attacks, invoking Article 51. As regards statements of principle, SC 
Resolution 1566 (2004) is particularly clear; in it the Council, acting under Chapter VII, 
“condemns in the strongest terms all acts of terrorism irrespective of their motivation, 
whenever and by whomsoever committed, as one of the most serious threats to peace and 
security” (UNSCR 1566, 2004). 
In contrast, the Security Council has not so far not actually directly authorized the 
use of anti-terrorist force as a military sanction. While stretching the interpretation of 
Article 41 UNC, it has refrained from applying Article 42 UNC in the fight against 
terrorism, which does not mean that it has not contemplated military sanctions. In SC 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, following 9/11, the UN Council expressly noted that the 
attacks of 9/11 had triggered a right of self-defense—but this amounted to a multilateral 
endorsement of a claim to use force unilaterally, rather than multilateral enforcement 
action in the sense of Article 42 (Tams, 2009). 
Second, this more expansive, accepted practice of self-defense has been driven, in 
no small part, by the use of force against non-state, terrorist groups, as demonstrated by 
the historical cases illustrated above. The proxy wars of the Cold War have given way, as 
seen in the next chapter, to a new norm in warfare and the nature of the use of force in 
general. The need for self-defense by states is thus, perhaps, greater than ever before as 
localized conflicts, crossing traditional state boundaries and fought amongst civilian 




true, collective security to address global, non-state terror threats is also, arguably, more 
in demand than at any time. This dual reality is challenging U.S. accepted notions of state 
self-defense, and the meaning of state-sponsorship of terror groups. 
Third, a growing, and perhaps worrying reality exists that these trends point 
toward an increasing tendency of the international community to accept use of force 
against non-state terrorist groups based on claims of self-defense, which in reality, serve 
less than truly defensive purposes. The result may be rather paradoxical: while 
unequivocally condemning the doctrine of armed reprisals, the international community 
seems increasingly inclined gradually to accept armed reprisals disguised as self-defense. 
In so doing, it may re-introduce an altogether flexible exception to the ban on force, 
which had been considered illegal for decades, and abandon an intrinsic feature of the 
right of self-defense. Even if this potential resurgence of armed reprisal fails to come to 
fruition in the coming years, the use of force, justified under the terms of self-defense, 
has clearly expanded beyond its original, historical intentions. Self-defense is now 
routinely used to justify unilateral use of force, particularly in the context of actions taken 
by states against non-state terrorist groups. In and of itself, this apparent commitment to 
international law in governing the use of force would seem to be a positive outcome—the 
international, legal justification for use of self-defense force is now an accepted reality. 
However, in application, this clearly impacts the actual meaning of self-defense (Tams, 
2009). 
In sum, moving beyond the original intentions of the UN Charter’s general 
prohibition on the use of force, the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War era, along 
with the common practice of the international community, has accepted an expanded 
exception for the use of self-defense force, particularly against non-state terrorist threats, 
which has occurred without a similar expansion of the UN Charter’s collective security 
provisions against such threats. States are freer to use force unilaterally against terrorist 
threats under the aegis of self-defense, and the UN Council appears less inclined to 
involve itself directly in such use of force, through its direct authorization or commitment 
of actual, UN forces (Tams, 2009). 
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Yet, shifts in historical and geopolitical context alone are not the only factors 
driving this shift in jus ad bellum toward an expanded definition of self-defense, 
particularly against non-state terrorist groups. Just as the realities of mutually assured 
destruction and super power supported insurgencies shaped, and often constrained, 
notions of self-defense during the Cold War, so today is the changing nature of warfare 




VII. ANALYSIS—EVOLVING NATURE OF USE OF FORCE  
A. OVERVIEW 
Having reviewed and identified the manner in which changes in historical context 
are forcing jus ad bellum on self-defense against non-state terror actors to change, how 
the evolving nature of the use of force itself is impacting how states justify military 
action against non-state terror groups is examined next. As the previous chapter 
recognized, the technological and tactical realities of how wars are fought are central to 
how international norms on just war, against any threat, take shape, which is certainly the 
case with non-state terrorist groups. Just as the threat of nuclear tipped intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and the use of proxy wars shaped accepted notions of self-defense 
during the Cold War, so too is a “devolution” and “localization” of warfare shaping 
contemporary norms, as contemporary warfare is increasingly fought at once, at the local 
and regional levels, in the form of civil conflict and domestic insurgencies while also 
being tied, through global ideological movements and communications, to the greater 
world. The central question to inspect in this chapter is the degree to which the scope, 
scale and duration of use of force against global, non-state terror groups are causing 
traditional norms of self-defense, including the principles of necessity, immanence, and 
proportionality, to bend, if not break. A brief review identifying the principle tenets of 
modern warfare is first, and then a evaluation of how these realities are creating an 
increased emphasis on necessity, a more regular or constant connotation of immanence, a 
more expansive concept of proportionality, and a lower bar for finding state sponsorship 
or support for non-state terror groups follows. 
B. THE CONTEMPORARY NATURE OF THE USE OF FORCE 
A series of authors provide critical insights on the development and reality of 
modern warfare. Martin Van Creveld argues that two visions of modern warfare have 
been competing since 2000. The first essentially argues that warfare will continue to 
follow the principles of Carl Von Clausewitz—“that war will continue to be used mainly 
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as an instrument of policy at the hand of one state against another” (Creveld, 2000, pp. 
213–217). Clausewitz argued that wars by an armed populace (a non-state actor) could 
only serve as a strategic defense (Headquarters, 2006. pp. 1–4), and that “the political 
aims [of war] are the business of the government alone” (Clausewitz, 1993, book 6, ch. 
26). He also contended, like the Newtonian physics that dominated his time, that every 
enemy had a single, center of gravity that if struck could knock an enemy terminally off-
balance (Clausewitz, 1993, book 3, ch. 15).  
The second vision, Creveld contends, to which he himself belongs, reasons that 
large-scale interstate warfare is at an end due to the proliferation and deterrent effects of 
nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition, as Marston describes, overwhelming 
conventional strength of U.S. and UK forces also make state-to-state conflict very 
unlikely, and that such conventional, battlefield dominance equally contributes to lower 
intensity conflicts being more likely and more complicated (Marston, 2010, p. 2), which 
however, does not mean an end to war. Instead, warfare, although potentially involving 
states, will more likely involve extremely bloody conflicts of limited geographic scope 
fought against or between organizations not state actors, Creveld contends (Creveld, 
2000, pp. 213–217). 
Building on Creveld’s second argument, Mary Kaldor asserts, quoting Hannah 
Arendt, “that power rests on legitimacy and not on violence,” and that, “the monopoly of 
legitimate violence has broken down. And what is crucial is not the privatization of 
violence, as such, but the breakdown of legitimacy” (Kaldor, 2001, pp. 114–115). It is 
worth noting that in some ways, Kaldor’s points, although very relevant to contemporary 
affairs, are rooted in quite ancient questions about the fundamental nature of power and 
government—are people to be ruled for their own protection, or is the ultimate security of 
the state rooted in the consent of the governed. Note that these questions were asked as 
early as Plato’s Republic and later in Hobbes’ Leviathan. In relation to the current 
modern setting, Kaldor contends,, “the new type of warfare has to be understood in terms 
of global dislocation (defined by those who participate in transnational networks and 
those who do not)” (Kaldor, 2001, pp. 69–70). Thus, seconding Creveld’s notion that 
modern war is fought largely by or against non-nation state actors, Kaldor conveys that 
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the nation state, in the 21st century, is no longer the sole possessor of legitimate, political 
power, and thus, no longer the sole makers of war. It is critical to observe that there have 
always been non-state actors and that long before the nation-state itself became the 
predominant unit of governance on the world’s stage, empires and princely states ruled. 
For the past 500 years, indeed the nation-state has served as the primary player in world 
affairs. Kaldor’s arguments are important to identify a new transition occurring in 
strategic, international affairs, but it must be remembered that the nation-state as a unit 
has never been alone on the world stage, only the leading player of recent history. Thus, 
Kaldor argues, “The new wars have political goals.” This idea is unlike nation-states 
during the 20th century, which fought wars to advance the interests of the nation and 
secure its nation’s borders, interests and resources. Instead, the aim of modern war “is 
political mobilization on the basis of identity. The military strategy for achieving this aim 
is population displacement and destabilization so as to get rid of those whose identity is 
different and to foment hatred and fear,” if necessary, on a global scale or using global 
trends and support to advance a cause (Kaldor, 2001, p. 10). To avoid the appearance of 
innocence in this paper’s analysis, it is essential to recognize that warfare has, is and 
likely always will ultimately be fought to kill enemies and take their resources, based on 
strategic demands. Yet, to be fair to Kaldor, the social, political and economic reasons 
that wars have been fought have and do change over time. Nazi Germany fought as much 
for control of Europe’s economic resources as it did the notion that Germany had a 
natural right to rule the continent. The protestors who recently brought down the 
Mubarrak regime in Egypt demonstrated as much out of anger over inflation, rising food 
prices and an absence of economic opportunity, as they did out of a belief that the regime 
that ruled them was illegitimate and undemocratic. It is necessary to understand Kaldor to 
argue that the major, driving force behind much of contemporary warfare, particularly 
civil wars, domestic insurgencies, and ethnic conflicts, is political authority reaped 
through possessing enough military and social strength to bring stability, and in turn, 
perceived legitimacy. 
Lawrence Freedman helps to give context to Kaldor’s notions by describing the 
War on Terror through the concept of “offensive liberal wars”, which are “designed to 
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bring liberal values to parts of the world where they are not yet in evidence,” and thus, 
“tend to focus on the balance of power within states rather than between states and reflect 
the growing importance of the norms of human and minority rights. [And, in turn] almost 
by definition challenge the norm of non-interference in internal affairs” (Freedman, 2006. 
p. 39). He also notes how the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized major 
problems like defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland, preventing or 
precluding WMD proliferation, and preventing state and non-state actors from acquiring 
them (Freedman, 2006, p. 16). In short, echoing Creveld and Kaldor, Freedman shows 
how increasingly, U.S. defense strategy must focus on fighting non-state actors and 
networks, irregular, asymmetric operations, and at times, enforcement of liberal values. 
Here again, it is essential to emphasize that while such strategy must adapt to the realities 
behind sources and nature of threats in modern conflict, the ultimate objective of use of 
force, particularly by major powers like the United States, remains achievement of 
national interest and strategic gain. Clearly, some such interests are rooted in political 
values and desired socio-political outcomes, but in the end, force is used to ensure the 
security of a state’s citizens against threats, and optimal influence and control over vital 
resources.  
Advancing on the notion that modern warfare is focused on conflict with and 
between non-state actors, Cebrowski focuses on the capabilities required to fight a 
modern war effectively by clarifying that, “The ambiguities resident in a complex 
adaptive environment demand flexibility”(Cebrowski, 2010, p. 8). Thus, in turn, “What is 
changing is the character of warfare just as societies, political entities and technologies 
change—our fixation with technical and industrial means of waging war is now 
misplaced—war is now a networked affair which is to say, war now requires the ability to 
create and preserve options, develop high transaction rates, develop high learning rates, 
and overmatching complexity at scale” (Cebrowski, 2010, p. 6). In short, modern warfare 
requires great plasticity, and the ability to develop more options for victory faster than the 
enemy can and then to have the strong, standing, diverse capabilities to implement such 
options quickly. 
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Finally, General Rupert Smith, capturing elements of each of the preceding 
authors and combining them with his own, extensive, real-world, experiences, defines six 
major characteristics of modern warfare (Smith, 2007, pp. 35–36): (1) the ends for which 
we fight are changing from hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more 
malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states; (2) we 
fight amongst the people, both literally and in the media; (3) our conflicts tend to be 
timeless since we are seeking a condition as opposed to a definitive outcome; (4) we fight 
so as not to lose the force, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost; (5) new uses 
are found for old weapons, since the tools of industrial war (EG tanks) are irrelevant to 
war amongst people; and (6) the sides are mostly non-state since we tend to conduct our 
conflicts and confrontations in some form of multinational grouping, or against some 
party(ies) that are not states. Smith summarizes these trends by affirming, “[they] reflect 
the reality of our new form of war: it is no longer a single massive event of military 
decision that delivers a conclusive political result.” As Smith implies, the ageing 
principles of Clausewitz, at least as originally conceived, are increasingly obsolete. 
Based on this review, modern warfare can be understood as: (1) largely comprised 
of conflicts against or between non-state actors, (2) fought more commonly amongst 
people themselves, along with critical infrastructure, military forces and resources, (3) 
fought over control of the political sources of legitimacy and consent, (4) driven by social 
values, or to defeat them, and, (5) fought on a complex, networked, global scale. More to 
the point, as Kaldor specifies, “modern war is about the need to protect people, get 
political process of consent going and support rule of law because new wars are fought 
by networks of state and non-state actors with few outright battles and most strikes 
against civilians” (Kaldor, 2005). Again, it must be understood that Kaldor and her 
contemporaries are demonstrating a shift in the emphasis of modern conflict and not an 
end to historical realities, and truths, of warfare. Just war, as a legal theory, must be 
understood as much through its precedents and statutes, as in the strategic environment in 
which it must be applied. The authors above have shown that today, jus as bellum must 
grow to better account for the use of force in self-defense by states against non-state  
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actors, particularly terrorist groups, with greater frequency, scope and scale. States 
remain the primary source of military force in the world, but the targets of their force, and 
threats their citizens face, requiring application of force, are increasingly non-state-based. 
C. KEY OBSERVATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
The reality of modern force itself is pushing current understanding of jus ad 
bellum on self-defense against non-state terror actors in three ways: (1) a heightened 
notion of necessity creating arguments for rights to preemptive and anticipatory self-
defense, (2) a sense of constant or regular immanency of threats through the 
accumulation of attacks, and (3) a potentially much broader idea of proportionality. 
1. Evolving Nature of Force and Its Impact on Necessity 
Accepted norms of necessity have been directly challenged and stretched because 
of changes in the nature of force. As seen previously, modern warfare, increasingly 
driven by socio-political and religious values, is inherently more erratic, less predictable, 
and arguably less “containable” than its Cold War era predecessors. Even use of force in 
places like Afghanistan by the United States, while driven by more general American 
strategic and security interests, must be understood as a response to a threat that viewed 
the world, and applied its own force, in terms of social-political-religious values—thus 
directly impacting and shaping the nature of the force the United States had to apply to 
achieve its strategic goals. Indeed, the Bush administration, although arguably driven by 
raw, military interests to defeat what it perceived as a long standing enemy, colored its 
subsequent invasion of Iraq in terms of spreading democracy and liberating a domestic 
population from tyranny. It increasingly poses a direct, imminent and persistent threat to 
the identity, values and existence of states themselves, as it is fought against or between 
“non-state” actors, including terrorist groups and groups linked to them, who fight for 
political legitimacy and consent, literally amongst the citizenry. Further complicating this 
reality is that unlike states, non-state actors are able to apply force for, relatively 
speaking, very low cost and very low risk, not having to keep and protect their own 
sovereign territory or secure long supply lines. The severity or degree of necessity in self-
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defense calculations is thus heightened for states as they seek to defend their citizens 
from threats not only against individual lives and infrastructure, but the perceived ability 
of the state itself to perform its vital functions. Clearly, states and their existence have 
been attacked before by external threats. What makes this threat different, in one critical 
way, is its apparent intent to strike at the perceived legitimacy and authority of the state 
to ensure key opportunities, rights and general stability for its citizens. When non-state 
actor terror groups combine this type of threat with the potential acquisition of weapons 
of mass destruction, necessity, for some if not all states, reaches a critical level. This 
heightened concept of necessity has manifested itself most directly on the issue of pre-
emptive and anticipatory self-defense, and the appropriate timing of use of force in self-
defense against non-state terror actors and their state supporters. 
As seen in this paper’s examination of the rules on self-defense, the temporal 
limitation of self-defense has come under pressure from different directions. No influence 
has been more significant to the question of the appropriate timing of self-defense, than 
the current nature of force. States’ assertions of a right of pre-emptive self-defense 
present the most obvious manifestation of this impact. That challenge has led to a more 
flexible handling of the necessity factor, particularly by nations, such as the United States 
and Israel. Indeed, in its 2001 National Security Strategy the United States explicitly 
argued for a right to preemption given the current global threat environment, and both the 
United States and Israeli routinely use force to eliminate threats that, under customary 
norms, do not fit the classic definition of necessity, which uses targeted killings with 
drones worldwide, or strike nascent nuclear power plants in Syria. Such use of force is 
pursued in no small part because the nature of modern warfare is so fast, diffuse, and 
often lethal, that opportunities to strike at critical targets often, simply cannot be passed 
up for fear of foregoing an opportunity to eliminate an otherwise imminent threat. No 
doubt exists that custom is impacted when the world’s principle power and a state 
routinely engaged in combat against terror groups, who both attempt to justify their uses 
of force in international legal terms, both interpret necessity to justify preemption. 
Preemption, and the desire to establish a stronger right to it in self-defense, particularly 
by contemporary major powers, is clearly a response to a changing, strategic 
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environment, which at once makes preemption a realistic option, unlike the Cold War, 
and one of necessity, given the nature of a non-state terror threat operating so as to be 
difficult to predict, with no formal declarations of hostilities. 
However, as also seen, an enhanced notion of necessity justifying preemption 
against non-state terror groups has yet become a universally accepted international norm. 
For the most part, few states have been unwilling, officially, to accept the U.S.’s 
argument for a right of pre-emptive self-defense. Indeed, the United Kingdom’s Attorney 
General, not known, typically, to oppose U.S. defense policy, has been adamant that, 
“international law permits the use of force in self-defense against an imminent attack but 
does not authorize the use of force to mount a pre-emptive attack against a threat that is 
more remote” (Rigstad, 2007). Such comments were made in the context of remote, 
targeted killings against actors on wanted lists, as opposed to suicide bombers literally en 
route to a strike. Furthermore, in his report, “In Larger Freedom,” Kofi Annan equally 
made it clear that Article 51 “covers an imminent attack,” but “[w]here threats are not 
imminent but latent, the UN Charter gives the Security Council full authority to use 
military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace and security” 
(Rigstad, 2007). The phrase, “including preventively” would appear, at least in theory, to 
leave the door open to preemptive self-defense force; however, Annan’s direct reference 
to the Security Council more than implies that such force, if ever used, must only come 
after the UN Charter’s security decision-making body, acting as proxy for international 
consent, has approved the action. Indeed, as seen shortly, it is more likely that Annan’s 
use of language implies a nascent right of anticipatory self-defense. Finally, the ICJ’s 
ruling in the DRC–Uganda case indicates findings similar to those of Annan. Responding 
to Uganda’s case for the defense of its security interests, including those not under a 
traditionally imminent threat, the ICJ argued that use of force cannot be used, under 
Article 51 to protect against merely perceived security interests, and that such concerns 
are most appropriately addressed by the Security Council (Rigstad, 2007). 
As is often the case in international law, exceptions to rules and dissenting 
opinions often, over time, become the rules and norms themselves. With time, this idea 
may well be the case with respect to heightened concepts of necessity and the notion that 
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they justify a right of preemptive self-defense. Certainly, the realities of contemporary 
force are not about to go away nor the manner in which such force is used by non-state 
terror actors. Taken together, however, the statements and findings above indicate that 
while a heightened concept of necessity in international affairs brought on by the realities 
of contemporary force exists, a resulting right of pre-emptive self-defense has yet to 
become an international norm under the Article 51 regime. 
Yet, while the realities of modern armed conflict have yet to force a clear right of 
preemption, the international community does appear to have moved closer to 
acknowledging the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense because of growing acceptance 
of the concept of accumulation. To examine this growing right, the impact of the nature 
of force in modern warfare on the immanency factor is addressed next. 
2. Immanency, the Nature of Force and the Impact of Accumulation 
Traditionally, pin prick attacks have not been seen to reach the level of an armed 
attack, nor to justify a right to self-defense. Accumulation becomes increasingly relevant 
to jus ad bellum because of the use of terrorist campaigns by non-state terror actors, using 
violence which in and of themselves, might not warrant all out war in self-defense by a 
state, but which taken together, certainly can attain such a level. The doctrine was much 
discussed by the litigants in the Cameroon–Nigeria, DRC-Uganda, and Oil Platforms 
cases. The ICJ did not expressly pronounce on the matter, but equally seemed inclined to 
accept it—hence its statement, in Oil Platforms, that “even taken cumulatively,” a series 
of incidents did not qualify as an armed attack on the United States. These statements 
suggest a trend towards the recognition of the “accumulation doctrine,” but may require 
further consolidation.  
The increasing legal acceptance of the concept of accumulation comes not only 
because of persistent legal wrangling, but also because of the realities of modern warfare. 
As Smith has revealed above, force is increasingly used by non-state as much as by state 
actors, and over extended periods of time, against and amongst civilian targets, with 
objectives  often less than well defined. Stated differently, pin prick attacks, traditionally 
viewed as mere skirmishes or “dust ups,” are far more common today than set-piece 
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battles with clear strategic objectives and clear beginnings and endings. these pin prick 
attacks are also increasingly part of ongoing, systematic terror campaigns designed to 
degrade the authority of the state itself to maintain order. As real world realities shift, so 
must law and custom. The accumulation doctrine thus helps to close what many have 
argued is a gap between Articles 2(4) and 51 and the notion that mere, low level uses of 
force, such as cross-border raids or skirmishes, do not rise to the level of armed attack, 
and thus, justify self-defense. 
Of course, the acceptance of accumulation produces some potentially serious side 
effects. Anticipatory self-defense is not meant to be the same as preemption. A difference 
exists between swatting the hand of a man seen loading and preparing to fire a gun, and 
shooting a man who owns a gun before he picks it up—thus, increasing acceptance of a 
right to anticipatory self-defense, but not necessarily, nor clearly yet, a right to outright 
preemption. Accumulation and its relationship with immanency, have the potential to 
become easily confused with the concept of necessity, and in turn, create the basis for an 
ongoing, lasting finding of necessity, which creates a potentially unending authorization 
to use force under the guise of self-defense. In counter to these concerns, it can, of 
course, be argued that realities are not going to go away—Taliban raids and support into 
Afghanistan from Pakistan are not going to stop because international law fails to vest a 
right of self-defense against low-level, cross-border insurgencies. The danger, however, 
is that concepts like accumulation, although properly arising in response to the realities of 
modern conflict, degrade the original intentions of the general prohibition on the use of 
force, and the concept that self-defense is intended as a limited exception—limited not 
only in terms of the frequency of its use, but also its duration, lasting only until the 
Security Council has taken action to restore order. In a world in which force is 
increasingly used constantly, at a low level, over extended periods of time and territory, 
the danger that an “open checkbook” for self-defense force can create can quickly be 
seen. States could feel justified in using force for however long and wherever they feel 
necessary to end the immanency of future attacks out of perceived, if not real, necessity. 
To some degree, the world has already seen this effect with Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan, an operation initially based on a broad, yet defensible reading of Article 
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51 UNC in response to a clear, immediate, imminent threat, and specific attacks, which 
has turned into a self-perpetuating military campaign serving a range of objectives, last 
over a decade. 
Closely related to the dangers of accumulation to undermining traditional, 
temporal, boundaries of self-defense, is the impact of the realities of modern warfare on 
the proportionality factor. 
3. Expanded Proportionality 
Arguably, no factor of self-defense has been more impacted by the modern nature 
of the use of force than that of proportionality. As seen earlier, proportionality is 
traditionally interpreted to permit a level of force sufficient to eliminate a threat; thus, 
self-defense force need not literally match the force originally used and can exceed it, but 
only as required to end its source. Modern warfare, and the kind of force utilized by non-
state terror groups, presents a significant challenge to traditional notions of 
proportionality because the source of such force is often spread over many countries, 
borders, local conflicts and civilian populations. Proportionality, historically, called for 
eliminating an enemy state’s supply hubs, military assets, or command and control 
structures, but not necessarily the annexation of large swaths of enemy territory, or 
targets worldwide (Gray, 2004, pp. 120, 160), such as, arguably, U.S. force in 
Afghanistan has been pursued since 9/11. As seen previously, non-state actor terrorist 
groups are often complex, networked, decentralized, and often operating on a global 
scale. Just how far can use of force be taken, under the guidelines of proportionality, 
when pursuing a group like Al Qaeda, whose core has been based in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but is also tied to regional conflicts and affiliate groups, worldwide?  
The limits of proportionality have not yet been clearly defined by international 
case law. However, U.S. military practice, and to a degree, UN Security Council 
resolutions, do provide an indication of the apparent boundaries of accepted, international 
custom.  
In the months prior to 9/11 the Bush administration had already departed from the 
policies of the Clinton administration by not launching targeted strikes in response to the 
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bombing of the USS Cole. According to Condoleeza Rice, this change in strategy came 
because President Bush was “tired of swatting flies” (Rigstad, 2007). This statement was 
meant to imply the administration found little to gain from destroying known training 
camps and bases when the organization itself was spread throughout Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and globally—limited strikes against such targets simply would not eliminate 
the threat, or its capacity to strike at U.S. targets. Indeed, as Rice elucidated, “There is a 
question of whether or not you respond in a tactical sense or whether you respond in a 
strategic sense, whether or not you decide that you are going to respond to every attack 
with minimal use of military force . . . on a kind of tit-for-tat basis . . .[or] . . . not doing 
this tit for tat, doing this on a time of our choosing” (Rigstad, 2007). 
Thus, little doubt remains that the Bush administration, even before 9/11, believed 
that for force to be effective against Al Qaeda, it would have to be applied 
“comprehensively” and globally. In addition, clearly, it did so, leading a coalition 
essentially to conquer Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda’s entire base of support in that 
country. Historically, such scope of force in self-defense (not outright war, but self-
defense), geographically, and temporally, is without precedent, which signals a 
potentially radical revision of the concept of proportionality.  
UN Security Council resolutions have, at least in part, apparently supported such 
revision. As seen earlier, U.S. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 condemned 
the attacks of 9/11, affirmed the right of self-defense, as well as the need to “combat by 
all means” the “threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” 
(Murphy, 2009, p. 121). These resolutions were followed first by Resolution 1386 
authorizing the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and 
then Resolution 1413 that authorized member states to take all necessary measures to 
fulfill ISAF’s mandate in Afghanistan (Murphy, 2009, p. 121). Such resolutions more 
than imply that the international community, at least in the limited, but extreme, example 
of Afghanistan, was willing to accept the annexation and reconstitution of a country to 
defeat a non-state, global terrorist threat. While such acceptance may well have come, in 
no small part, as a result of general sentiment for the United States following 9/11 and the 
recognition that Al Qaeda posed a threat to countries besides the United States, the 
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precedent, for jus ad bellum, is real and as seen, is in line with a series of historical, legal 
trends surrounding jus as bellum and justification of self-defense force against non-state 
terror actors.  
Obviously, international reaction to the subsequent invasion of Iraq indicates that 
international tolerance of enhanced proportionality has its limits—the world will not 
support the invasion of a country just because one state says a terrorist threat exists 
within its borders that could affect places outside them. Yet, the precedent of Afghanistan 
is set and it must be considered that if, following another, large, mass casualty attack by a 
non-state terror group, if similar application of self-defense force would be, again, 
permitted.  
Some evidence of proportionality’s redefined limits based on reactions to U.S. 
actions since 2002 may exist. Since the initial invasion of Afghanistan, the United States 
has continued routinely to launch targeted strikes into Pakistan’s federally governed 
territories, southern Yemen, Somalia and likely many other places that remain classified, 
against select terrorist targets. As Murphy notes, actions in Waziristan have occurred, for 
the most part, with the apparent consent of the Pakistani, and other states’, governments 
(Murphy, 2009, pp. 132–133). While the killings themselves are often criticized on 
humanitarian grounds, or as violations of jus en bello, the tacit consent appears to satisfy 
questions of their justification as proportional under jus ad bellum. Tactically, such use of 
force clearly provides a state like the United States with the ability to match the nature of 
the force and threat posed by a non-state actor—it matches the evolution in the use of 
force itself. However, in so doing, justifying and applying self-defense force wherever 
necessary to match the non-state threat, serious questions are raised about the meaning of 
state sovereignty and authority. Without doubt, this type of force broadens current 
understanding of the accepted limits of proportionality to be more expansive than 
traditionally thought. 
In sum, changes in the strategic realities of force, and the nature of contemporary 
conflict themselves are causing jus ad bellum on self-defense against non-state actors, to 
evolve. A heightened concept of necessity is increasingly justifying a right to anticipatory 
self-defense, bordering on, but not yet, finding a full right to preemption. An enhanced 
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notion of accumulation is allowing states to find immanency in a campaign of lower level 
terror strikes. In addition, the theory of proportionality has been advanced to allow for 
application of force on a much larger geographic and temporal scale than, arguably, any 
time in history, due to the tactical and operational realities of non-state terror groups, 
particularly those operating transnationally. The primary purposes and intentions of war 
have not gone away. War remains violence used to kill enemies for strategic ends. The 
state remains the primary user and controller of such violence. However, as seen above, 
the manner of force used by the primary threats to states has shifted, and the owners of 
such force have increasingly become non-state actors. 
Taken together, it is possible to begin to see how shifts in historical context and 
evolutions in the nature of force themselves, are connected to, and impacting how state 
sovereignty is understood, which results, in no small part, because of the need to pursue 
the use of force in defense against non-state terror actors, and to do so, in synergy with 
the reality of modern force itself. Consequently, the next chapter examines how 
international law and practice on self-defense against non-state terror groups is 
challenged to account for such transnational threats, and in turn, potentially force current 
understanding of state sovereignty to evolve.  
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VIII. ANALYSIS—CHANGING NORMS OF STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
A. OVERVIEW 
As seen, jus ad bellum on self-defense is evolving due to a variety of strategic 
factors related to the advent of non-state terror actors. A shift in the character of the 
identity of the state itself brought about, at least in part, by transnational terrorist groups, 
and other non-state actors, is vital to understand given that the principle actor that jus ad 
bellum has sought to regulate, certainly for the past 60 years, arguably the last 500, is the 
state.  
In many ways, the advent of non-state actor terrorist groups operating on the 
global stage has reaffirmed the primary role of the state in international affairs. Al Qaeda, 
on 9/11, was clearly striking at the American state, its symbols of power, authority and 
prosperity. The U.S. response, and global affirmation of it, demonstrated without doubt, 
where ultimate power resided on the world stage and confirmed that the primary 
protector and defender of citizens is and remains the nation-state. What had changed, 
however, was the risk calculation of primary threats facing the nation-state—while 
interstate geopolitics and resource control remained a critical component of the threat-
interest matrix—the placement of non-state actor terror threats had to rise. In turn, to 
address such increasingly common, and lethal non-state threats effectively, the nation-
state itself may have to change, or arguably, is already undergoing an evolution. In this 
context, the limitations of jus ad bellum as applied to non-state terror actors operating 
globally may, in fact, be part of a larger trend involving how the United States defines 
sovereignty and the modern state themselves. 
As Hobbes argued so fundamentally, and long ago, the primary duty of the state is 
to ensure the security and stability of the realm and its citizenry (Jackson, 2007, pp. 135–
160). With the birth of modern international relations, came the notion, or accepted 
reality, that certain affairs were inherently domestic and others particularly international. 
Those affairs considered inherently domestic were clearly governed under the authority 
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of the state, and most decidedly not any other, foreign, external state or actor. 
Conversely, those affairs considered inherently international occurred on a global stage, 
which was, essentially, lawless and ungoverned. As seen throughout the 20th century, 
particularly in the past 60 years, a growing body of international law designed to regulate 
the affairs of sovereign nation-states has advanced. 2(4) and Article 51 are two critical, 
albeit limited, examples of how international law, regulation and custom, has come to 
impact increasingly and directly the conduct of states. Despite these trends toward 
globalization, and perhaps the beginnings of “global governance,” the U.S.-led 
international response to 9/11 has demonstrated that the primary vehicle for the defense 
of citizens, and guarantor of global order, remains the state (Jackson, 2007, pp. 135–160).  
Yet, the threat of non-state actor terrorism on the global stage still presents direct 
challenges to U.S. concepts of state sovereignty (Jackson, 2007, pp. 135–160). Non-state 
terrorists are clearly capable of applying force to justify a finding of armed attack, and 
thus, warlike behavior, but it remains, fundamentally, a form of inter-state or non-state 
criminal—a form, which, as seen, occupies a grey zone between domestic, criminal law, 
and international jus ad bellum, more lethal than normal murderers, but of insufficient 
power and character to take on the form of a traditional military opponent. 
Concurrently, also observed has been that the nature of force itself in international 
affairs increasingly resembles what historically has been thought of as civil strife and/or 
terrorism, both, historically considered, far more domestic in nature, than international. In 
short, a recipe for far more force to be used more often and in more conflicts should these 
trends continue, but, perhaps, for that force to be applied with greater precision at more 
specific targets, albeit over more extended periods of time and distance from a victim 
state. Furthermore, states may increasingly have to think of force, when applied in self-
defense to non-state terror actors, as an extension of domestic, criminal investigations, 
not unlike the United Kingdom’s definition of terrorism under the United Kingdom 
Terrorism Act of 2000, which emphasizes that terrorism includes actions both within and 
outside the UK itself, upon any person or property, regardless of international boundaries, 
but still, with emphasis on the relationship of states to one another, and their boundaries 
and jurisdictions (Jackson, 2007, p. 159).  
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To examine this issue fully in the context of this paper’s central questions, it is 
necessary to briefly review the following: first, the nature and legitimacy of modern 
international law, second, consider the nature of today’s non-state actor threat to 
international peace in greater detail, third, examine the manner in which such 
transnational, non-state actor terrorist groups relate to, challenge, and threaten 
international law and its system of state sovereignty, and fourth, reach a set of key 
observations for the central question. 
B. NATURE AND LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A comprehensive review of the development and current state of the nature of 
contemporary international law and its sources of legitimacy is outside the scope of this 
paper. However, as noted above, a brief review is important to set up the remainder of 
this paper’s examination of the implications of shifts in definitions of state sovereignty 
for the application of jus ad bellum to non-state terror actors.  
Economic globalization and new security threats have led to a new kind 
international law. Such law is built on institutions, treaties, case law and norms 
established after the WWII, including the 2(4) general prohibition on the use force and 
the limited exceptions of Article 51. As seen, innovations, such as these, are, historically, 
remarkable, in that they seek to regulate directly what has been considered the ultimate 
hallmark of statehood—control over the use of force to defend the state and its citizens. 
On the surface, this transformation was significantly more impressive than that which 
occurred in the 1990s, notwithstanding a shift toward institutionalization in the form of 
the International Criminal Court and the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, 
subtle institutional changes have changed the practice of international law across three 
primary dimensions (Kumm, 2004).  
First, international law now covers a much broader range of topics. Today, the 
traditional divide between the issues addressed by liberal democracies as domestic 
matters and those as foreign has been significantly reduced. State boundaries remain very 
relevant even with the dramatic expansion of globalization. However, forces outside 
democratic, domestic decision-making processes increasingly determine just how such 
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borders are made relevant. A new, growing, increasingly deep set of substantive rules and 
regulations affect matters historically, solely decided by national legal processes, such as 
customs, immigration, currency values, environmental safeguards, and security (Kumm, , 
2004).  
Second, the ways in which international law is produced are creating increased 
distance between the creation of new obligations under such law and the explicit consent 
of states. Contemporary treaties, while still grounded in state ratification, pass on powers 
to treaty-based, “governing” bodies that maintain an almost legislative or judicial nature, 
such as the WTO or even special military tribunals. These organs are authorized, by 
treaty, to settle on the specific obligations the states are under, again, by treaty. 
Therefore, the treaty becomes a framework for dealing with a specified range of issues, 
and once the states have signed on, their specific rights and obligations are determined 
without their explicit consent by these treaty-based bodies—the states consent to the 
decision-making framework, and in doing so, agree to abide by that system’s decisions 
(Kumm, 2004).  
International law, with these features, thus takes on an almost governmental form. 
International law as governance blurs the distinction between national and international 
law. In this way, on many issues, it is increasingly difficult to find a bright line between 
international and national law, except with the one, obvious exception that national law is 
derived from a clear, liberal democratic process and international law, is derived, at its 
clearest, from the voting of the representatives of states in one of the treaty-based, 
“governing” bodies described above (Kumm, 2004). 
No doubt exists that in practice, state representatives, authorized by national 
constitutions, remain the primary actors on the world stage. Yet, the increased presence 
and authority of non-state actors, such as international courts, tribunals, transnational 
bureaucracies, humanitarian assistance organizations, multi-national corporations, 
individuals, and as seen, terrorist groups operating transnationally, if not globally, have 
emerged as significant participants in the international legal process, and international 
law itself has taken on an almost “state-governance” form in many issue areas. Still,  
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networks of national governments, national administrators and national courts remain at 
the very heart of global governance—as Anne Marie Slaughter aptly describes, “The state 
has not disappeared, it has become disaggregated.” 
Nowhere have these dual trends been more apparent than in the case of U.S. use 
of force against the global terrorist threat since 9/11. Following 9/11, no doubt exists that 
that the United States would respond military and that very little would stand in its way 
when doing so. Yet, the United States, and the rest of the world, still went and appealed 
to the UN Security Council to fulfill treaty obligations and receive the approval, if not 
consent, of international law, to pursue military action in Afghanistan, and subsequently, 
authority to administer and secure that country. Realists will argue this was a pro forma 
effort, that the United States could act as it saw fit regardless, and that following 9/11, 
world sympathy and support for the United States all but assured tacit approval for U.S. 
action. Yet, UN Charter obligations were still strong enough that the United States still 
worked to have its use of force authorized by the UN process, and no doubt exists not 
only the United States has put troops on the ground in Afghanistan to help prevent future 
terrorist threats from developing there. Realists will argue, correctly to some degree, that 
states, particularly powerful ones, engage forms, such as the Security Council, when it 
serves their interests, legitimization of otherwise unilateral use of force not the least 
amongst such interests. Moreover, indeed, as seen in earlier chapters, the United States 
has long committed itself to exercising its right of self-defense as it sees fit, arguing in 
favor of preemption, amongst other rights. Yet, the fact that even a great power, such as 
the United States, feels that the bonds of the UN Charter regime are strong enough to 
compel it to at least shape its arguments for force in terms of Article 51, and to seek 
Security Council approval, more than indicates a significant impact of the UN Charter 
and related international law on self-defense on sovereign, U.S. defense decisions. 
The counterexample of the later U.S.-led invasion of Iraq helps make this point. 
Once again, the United States sought UN and international approval for its invasion, but 
did not wait for clear Security Council authorization. While the international system 
actually was not strong enough to prevent U.S. action, it was strong enough to force, at 
minimum, a degree of U.S. deference to the Security Council  attempting to at least make 
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the argument that its actions were justified, if not authorized, by past Security Council 
resolutions. The point made earlier becomes clear—the state remains the primary actor in 
global affairs, but its ability to act is increasingly, significantly regulated and impacted by 
a system of international law that is, in many ways, at most, approaching governance, and 
at minimum, is creating a greater division between actual state consent and international, 
legal obligations. How then, does this trend toward the increased strength of international 
law over state affairs and its impact on state sovereignty, relate to the nature of the threat 
of non-state, terrorist actors?  
C. NON-STATE ACTOR THREATS, THEIR CHALLENGES TO STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND SHIFTS IN GLOBAL ORDER 
Armed, non-state actors directly challenge security governance. These actors 
undermine the state’s traditional monopoly on the use of force. They can even, in extreme 
circumstances, replace or supplant the state and its security apparatus, at least sub-
nationally.  
In general, armed non-state actors: 1) use violence to pursue their objectives, 2) 
are not integrated into traditional state institutions like standing armies, police or special-
forces, and therefore, 3) have some degree of self-rule of their politics, resources, 
infrastructure and decisions to use force. They can, as seen, be supported or used by state 
actors officially or informally, and state officials can be directly or indirectly ingrained in 
the activities of such actors (Bailes, Schneckener, & Wulf, 2007). 
Most such armed non-state actors share two basic characteristics. First, the 
targeting of their violence does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants 
as international law, and states, do. As seen in the previous chapter, in modern conflicts, 
particularly intra-state ones, the line between combatants and noncombatants is 
increasingly blurred. Second, especially since the 1990s, such groups increasingly 
operate transnationally using networks and global ties to thrive and gain new room to 




smuggling routes and “shadow” markets, and facilitates the movement and 
communication of political agendas and ideological propaganda through international 
supporters and global communications networks (Bailes et al., 2007). 
Non-state actor terrorist groups exist within a spectrum of armed non-state actors, 
each with their own types of objectives, foundations and characteristics. Table 2 
summarizes this spectrum to give context to the nature of the non-state actor terrorist 
threat, and demonstrates how this particular type of group is an important part of the 
spectrum, but still part of a larger trend in current international affairs showing the 
growing influence of non-state actors over the control of the use of force. In sum, the 
dominance that the nation-state has possessed over the use of force for the past 500 years, 
and in particular, the past 100 years, is being reduced as the influence of non-state actors, 
particularly terror groups, rises.  
 
 
Table 2.   Types of Armed Non-State Actors. (From: Bailes et al., 2007) 
Non-state actor terrorist groups thus pose a challenge to traditional definitions and 
functions of state sovereignty, as well as the sources and legitimacy of force in global 
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affairs. The control of the use of force in global affairs has traditionally been seen as the 
ultimate characteristic, if not purpose, of state identity. Terrorist force is, instead, a 
pervasive form of social and political violence that challenges state institutions and global 
security. Non-state actor terrorist groups operate across international borders, and engage 
in an almost global insurgency of extremism that transects the traditional boundaries of 
crime and war, which poses major challenges to defense, intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies. These systems of global insurgents merge political and religious 
fanaticism with traditionally criminal behavior and systems that challenge the rule of law 
and changes how states relate to one another and the authority they carry in international 
affairs. Pioneered by the vanguard of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, they today link 
many other networks, including notably Jemaah Islamiya and Lasker-e-Toiba, together in 
their quest for a new caliphate and ultimately to disrupt the legitimacy and function of 
liberal democracies worldwide. In so doing, these networks of networks challenge the 
nation-state given their diffuse nature, at times appearing headless, and at others 
appearing multi-headed. Their component parts will often “swarm,” to concentrate, focus, 
and mass resources to conduct an attack or campaign (Sullivan & Bunker, 2009). These 
evolutions in the sources of and control over force in global affairs are occurring 
concurrently with a potential shift in the identity of the nation-state itself. 
Three authors have made it possible to understand the shifting global order in 
which the United States and other states currently reside.  
Joseph Nye argues that the 21st century presents the United States and other states 
with a complex distribution of power and that more and more factors are outside the 
control of even the most powerful states (Nye, 2002, p. 40). Contending that 9/11 should 
be a wakeup call for the United States, Nye notes that while the United States remains, 
singularly, the most powerful economic, military and social force in the world, more 
measures of power, quite simply, exist that traditional metrics of international influence 
do not capture, which are brought on by the real-time, global exchange of information 
and the vastly increased scale and speed of global travel, trade, and interdependence 
(Nye. 2002, p. 40). He quotes Sebastian Mallaby, when concluding, “The paradox of 
American power at the end of this millennium is that it is too great to be challenged by 
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any other state, yet not great enough to solve problems such as global terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation” (Nye, 2002, p. 40). No doubt, American power, even at its peak 
following WWII, or the collapse of the Soviet Union, has always had its limits, if not 
more limitations than actual strengths. However, more significantly, the current global 
stage requires state interests to be pursued along a variety of lines, not simply “military” 
and “diplomatic” but rather, a whole spectrum of influence competing with a far greater 
variety of actors. Thus, to describe the basic dichotomy of American power, Nye 
describes hard and soft power, the former indicative of the nation’s ability to apply 
military force and economic might to international problems, and the latter indicative of 
the nation’s ability to persuade, coerce, and negotiate solutions through cultural, 
diplomatic and systemic influence (Nye, 2002, p. 9). 
Building on Nye’s concept of a complex array of American power, Mead argues 
that the contemporary influence of states in international affairs can be divided into four 
categories, including sharp, sticky, sweet, and, in the limited case of the United States, 
hegemonic power. Each of these elements focuses, respectively, on military force, treaty 
networks and collective defense arrangements, trade, economic and military assistance 
incentives, and finally, again, in the case of the United States, the general, global 
influence of being the world’s most powerful nation (Mead, 2004, pp. 26–40, ch. 3). He 
argues that the war on terror should be fought and won through a grand strategy that uses 
an updated form of Communist containment, which focuses on being more proactive, 
ideologically persuasive and opposes Arab fascism (Mead, 2004, p. 167). Like Nye, 
Mead recognizes that American power alone cannot defeat modern, global terrorism. He 
writes, “Governments that cannot police their territory pose serious security risks in a 
world where terrorists are looking for safe havens and bases… unless the United States 
and its allies find ways to promote orderly and peaceful development… terror will 
flourish and our security at home will be endangered” (Mead, 2004, p. 167). 
Nye and Mead identify important trends. American power is global, but has 
limitations, its interests require alliances to be achieved, and security against terror 
requires a global response. Here again, it must be emphasized that perhaps most 
significantly, today, those interests must be pursued along a wider variety of lines, not 
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simply “military” and “diplomatic” but rather, a whole spectrum of influence competing 
with a far greater variety of actors that links what were once considered strictly, or 
inherently, domestic affairs, with international affairs, and vice versa. Domestic security, 
and thus rule of law, has become inextricably tied to global events and actors. Their work 
can also be read to imply that, at least to some degree, the nature of the state itself is 
evolving alongside the threats it faces, including the modern, non-state actor terrorist 
threat.  
Philip Bobbitt thus argues that in the 21st century, the advent of the market state 
is about to be witnessed. As he describes, “the Market states say: Give us power and we 
will give you new opportunities. In contrast to the nation state, the market state does not 
see itself [as the nation-state did] as more than a minimal provider or re-distributor of 
goods and services…[market states] abandon these enterprises and see their role as 
enabling and assisting rather than directing the citizen’s interaction with choice” (Bobbitt, 
2008, p. 88). For Bobbitt, the innovation to be understood is not that the international 
stage includes major powers that serve as guarantors of the peace, but rather, the nature 
of what such powers are guaranteeing, such as, historical efforts to maintain, for example, 
a balance of powers in Europe, as compared to today’s efforts to ensure the global flow 
of commerce, communications, and finance. Bobbitt further elucidates that the rise of the 
market state comes as the result of the success of the nation state model and U.S. victory 
of the long war of the 20th century that culminated in the end of the Cold War. By 
victory, he does not mean the literal collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather, the overall, 
global acceptance of parliamentary democracy, liberal rights, market-based economics, 
globalized trade, finance, communications, information and increasingly the 
“universalization” of culture, or at least, the global spread of major cultural trends 
(Bobbitt, 2008, p. 87). Whereas the nation-state promised to “continually improve the 
material well-being of all its citizens,” the market state outsources many key functions, 
reduces its size, relies less on brute regulatory force and instead focuses on market 
demands and incentives to help ensure opportunities (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 87).  
The market state’s legitimacy, therefore, rests on its ability to ensure 
opportunities, and freedoms, for its individual citizens based on their consent. This point 
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must be emphasized. The key ingredient to the market state’s legitimacy is the 
individual’s consent to and trust in a state that will ensure opportunities, not necessarily 
those of huge segments of society seeking a new right or support mechanism, but a 
person’s own, individual opportunities and freedoms (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 87). 
Drawing from the trends observed in the preceding chapter, and the points form 
Bobbit above, conflict in the 21st century can, therefore, continue to be defined as a 
matter between states, or constitutional entities, created by and wielding law (Bobbitt, 
2008, p. 125), but takes on a very different character from the industrial, nation-state 
warfare of the 20th century, which Americans, and their military, have come to presume 
as normal. Instead, standing in opposition to the market states, including the United 
States, will be non-state, terror actors or “market state terrorists” (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 126). 
Such market state terrorists are essentially the dark mirror of the market state that 
capitalizes on all of the same forces that give rise to the market state, but using them to 
attack the very source of legitimacy of the market state, namely, its ability to ensure and 
deliver opportunities to and at the consent of the individual (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 85).  
Under this theory, Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda is a malignant and mutated 
version of the market-state itself. As such, Al Qaeda and its kin are more than stateless 
gangs. These new-networked adversaries possess near-standing armies, treasury and 
revenue sources (even if derived from criminal enterprises), a bureaucracy or ‘civil’ 
service, intelligence collection and analysis organs, welfare systems, and the ability to 
make alliances (with state and non-state entities). They also promulgate law and policy, 
and declare war, albeit not the kind of formal, state-on-state war that international law 
accounts for and now defines. As such, the Al Qaeda network and others like it are virtual 
states, except that its primary interests lie in advancing its fundamentalist, Islamic 
ideology and eliminating any influence in opposition to it. These virtual states are non-
territorial market-states (although they sometimes hold and control territory) and through 
insurgency seek to hold or influence more, with the ultimate goal of replacing a system of 
liberal rights, with the Caliphate system, as Bobbitt contends, regarding the case of Al 
Qaeda. 
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Organizations like Al Qaeda are thus an early, although almost certainly not the 
last example, of a modern terror state. While this organization lacks formal territory as 
customarily understood, it carries many if not most of the essential characteristics of the 
market state itself. It is global in reach and goals, it is devolved, outsourcing its 
operations and functions to local organizations and specialists, it uses global trade, 
finance, communications and information exchange to finance, plan, organize and 
publicize its activities, and although it lacks territory of its own, per se, it has clearly 
demonstrated the ability to coerce and manipulate traditional nation-state regimes to its 
ends, as in Sudan, Afghanistan, and arguably, Pakistan (Bobbitt, 2008, pp. 126–128). In 
the 21st century, war in its most formal sense is against market-state terror, or, as Bobbitt 
aptly describes, “In the twentieth century, terrorism was wielded for domestic purposes; it 
was the extension of internal politics, as it were, by criminal means. With the creation of 
al Qaeda, terrorism has internationalized, and it has become the extension of diplomacy 
by other means” (Bobbitt, 2008, p. 143). Historians will rightly note internationally 
operating terrorist organizations have long been in existence and have wrought violence 
on countries other than the United States. Bobbitt would counter, however, that market-
state terror is a new evolution in such trends, in that it does not seek to assert a particular 
ethno-nationalist identity and right to self-determination, but rather, attempts to supplant 
the system in which nation-states operate from the outset. 
It is critical to note that Nye, Mead, and most significantly Bobbitt, are identifying 
trends and not necessarily absolute, contemporary realities. States, armies, territories, 
borders and sovereignty are all still absolutely relevant in international affairs. The 
process of change described above is not distributed evenly around the world. Perhaps the 
most important lesson to be gleaned from the apparent shifts in global order described 
previously is that warfare between states as known during the 20th century has, arguably, 
become increasingly too expensive, both literally and in terms of the costs to global trade, 
commerce, transportation and communication, to be fought. Yet, concurrently, use of 
force by non-state actors has become more inexpensive to use on a truly global stage, 
than ever before. Thus, jus ad bellum on self-defense may, with time, have to be used by 
states not against other states, but rather, against transnational threats to the operation of 
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the global market system the United States has come to take almost for granted, 
including, quite possibly the most pervasive of such treats, non-state terrorists groups 
operating globally. 
D. KEY OBSERVATIONS FOR THE CENTRAL QUESTION 
In more immediate, and practical terms, the challenges and shifts identified above 
likely support the notion that the bar for attributing support from a state to a non-state 
terror group is currently being lowered within jus ad bellum on self-defense. As the 
divisions between domestic criminal and international defense interests are increasingly 
punctuated, states are more likely to apply self-defense in places well beyond their 
boundaries to eliminate non-state terror threats. Combined with the additional themes of 
globalization described above, in which states pursue their interests in more active 
competition, or cooperation, with non-state actors, states are more likely to find less 
distance between a non-state actor and the state in which it resides. As in the evolutions 
described earlier, a more lenient standard of attribution should not be seen as 
revolutionary but as a process of reform. Contemporary practice, as that in Afghanistan 
following 9/11, suggests that a territorial state has to accept anti-terrorist measures of 
self-defense directed against its territory where it is responsible for complicity in the 
activities of terrorists based on its territory. Such complicity can take the form of either 
support below the level of effective control, or more proactive provision of a safe haven. 
Attribution can also, potentially, take the form of a non-state actor coming to have such 
influence over its host state that the non-state actor effectively, ironically, becomes the 
state authority—again, increasing the likelihood of a victim state attributing armed attack 
to a state “supporter” of “non-state” terrorism. This lowered bar is significant, because it 
means that if a non-state actor terror threat is found to reach a sufficient threshold of 
significance internationally, organs of international legal governance like the UN 
Security Council can act to authorize use of force against not only the terror group, but 




essentially, the annexation and reconstitution of such states. Needless to say, this notion 
represents a shift in the meaning of and level of deference to state sovereignty in 
international relations. 
In more prospective and perhaps theoretical terms, the challenges and shifts 
identified above support the notion that international security today really means ensuring 
the successful operation of the global, market place and guaranteeing citizens’ rights 
under that system. Jus ad bellum on self-defense may thus, over time, be increasingly 
used to justify the use of force in self-defense of networks, or alliances, of states, to 
address the non-state terrorist threat effectively. In turn, such just use of force in self-
defense may be used to warrant a spectrum of alternative forms of force to combat 
transnational terrorist groups, ranging from traditional, military occupation, to targeted 
killings, to law enforcement, intelligence operations, and financial regulation.  
Thus, the advent of the non-state actor, transnational terror threat connects to a 
larger shift occurring in global affairs related to the growth in importance and power, in 
general, of non-state actors, and in turn, a changing role and definition, although not 
extinction, of the state itself. It is a shift that jus ad bellum must account for if states are 
supposed to remain the primary means of defense for citizens and the “global order.” The 
state will remain the primary unit, or actor, in this system, but self-defense force itself, 
and the legal means of justifying it, will have to become more flexible and fine-tuned to 
address the threats faced by the global market system in which the state resides. 
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IX. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
Having established the rules currently governing jus ad bellum on use of self-
defense force against non-state actor terrorist groups, and analyzed them in the contexts 
of shifts in historical context, evolutions in the nature of force in modern warfare, and 
changes in the nature and accepted definitions of the state, it is possible to reach a series 
of basic conclusions on how international law is being affected, if not pushed, to its limits 
by these factors. Furthermore, certain observations can be arrived at on how such law 
may have to evolve to address the ongoing issue of how states can legally use force 
against transnational, non-state actor terrorist groups more effectively.  
First, jus ad bellum on self-defense has not been broken or made irrelevant by 
having to be applied to non-state actor, terrorist groups. On the contrary, as discussed 
further later in this chapter, if anything, this area of international law has only become 
more relevant in global affairs. However, it is clearly being forced to evolve and be 
applied on a scope and scale not originally foreseen nor intended, to potentially 
dangerous effect, first and foremost, because of a shift of historical context. Whereas 
Article 51 and the UN Charter focused originally on state-on-state conflict and pushed 
“global” issues of non-state actor threats, WMD proliferation, and human rights 
violations to the periphery of thinking on jus ad bellum; today, such “global” cross border 
issues are now clearly at the forefront of and at least of equal importance to state-on-state 
conflict in matters of international security. In addition, the original intent of UN Security 
Council-based collective security has not been realized, even with the end of the Cold 
War and its stifling effects on the operation of the Security Council. As a result of these 
two factors, the originally intended, limited exception to the general prohibition on the 
use of force, self-defense, has in fact, become an international norm when justifying 
force. This shift has come in no small part because of the advent of non-state actor terror 
threats causing increased application of self-defense force in the modern era—a reality 
demonstrated through a series of varying examples ranging from the response to 9/11 to 
Columbian strikes at FARC rebels in Ecuador. 
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Second, shifts in historical context have combined with evolutions in the nature of 
force itself to cause the central tenets of jus ad bellum to evolve significantly. As 
observed, the threat of non-state terror groups, particularly when operating 
transnationally, has created an enhanced notion of immanency which is in turn, most 
likely, creating a clear right to anticipatory self-defense—striking at non-state terror 
threats based on “of the moment” intelligence across the borders of other states. When 
combined with a heightened sense of necessity, brought about by the non-state terror 
threat joined with the potential acquisition of WMD, also observed has been that more 
states, including the United States and Israel, attempt to find a complete right of 
preemptive self-defense in contemporary jus ad bellum. Finally, the concept of 
proportionality, historically defined as permitting application of such force necessary to 
eliminate an imminent threat of necessity, has expanded significantly and is being used to 
justify persistent, often global, lasting military operations in places like Afghanistan and 
Iraq, as well as ongoing, smaller scale strikes in places like South Waziristan and the 
Horn of Africa. Collectively, these progressions indicate a more expansive interpretation 
of the inherent right of self-defense being brought about by the response to non-state 
terror actors. 
Third, the erosion of the general prohibition, when combined with these more 
expansive interpretations of self-defense norms, has created a juxtaposition in jus ad 
bellum, as one supposedly central tenet of international law on use of force is 
depreciated, while another is used more and more expansively. The irony is that 
increased use of the inherent right of self-defense to justify force against non-state actor 
terror threats has created an almost historically unprecedented emphasis on rule of law 
over use of force in international affairs (Kennedy, 2006, p. 129), while at the same time, 
arguably allowing more force to be used on the international stage. 
It is not entirely clear if such increased application of the inherent right of self-
defense, brought about in no small way by the threat of non-state terror actors, is a truly 
positive or negative development. In one sense, it is a positive development as states, 
including the worlds most powerful, are now clearly committed to a body of international 
law intended to govern and regulate the use of force. Conversely, it is also a negative 
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trend in that, this increased emphasis on legal positivism in jus ad bellum on self-defense 
against non-state actor terror threats has, perhaps, created the wrong relationship between 
the inherent right of self-defense and the use of force. As states use law and practice as a 
pretext for force they would seek to use even without an immediate non-state actor, terror 
threat, they arguably degrade the meaning of the inherent right of self-defense by using it 
to pursue force, which is no longer truly in self-defense. The truth will likely have to be 
found in the future study of history. 
Fourth, current use of jus ad bellum to justify self-defense against non-state terror 
actors is, potentially, in conflict, or at least in contrast with, trends in international 
relations toward more open and relaxed concepts of state sovereignty, brought out about 
by the advent of global markets, communications, transportation and interdependence of 
states. The welfare and stability of sovereign states are increasingly linked, and, 
consequently, so too are the threats facing them. While the state remains the primary 
actor in global affairs, serving as the defender and stabilizer of last resort, its influence is 
increasingly being met and challenged by a growing number of non-state actors operating 
transnationally that control sufficient resources and force to attack the authority and 
legitimacy of states themselves. Globalization has given rise to a series of truly global, 
non-state threats. Non-state terror groups are one such threat, perhaps the most prevalent 
and prominent, particularly when combined with the threat posed by the proliferation of 
WMD.  
Legally, in the short term, these shifts in U.S. notions of state sovereignty have 
likely contributed to a lowering of the bar for finding attribution of state support to non-
state actor terror groups.  
Quite simply, heightened norms of necessity and enhanced immanency have 
driven more states to find a need to strike at non-state terror groups residing in other 
countries at will, and to attack not only the groups themselves, but their sources of 
support including the states in which they reside, even when actual state support or 
effective control by such states is unclear, or debatable. The primary examples of this 
lowered bar have been U.S. action in Sudan following the East Africa embassy  
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bombings, and of course, the invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent removal of the 
Taliban regime, but also, actions by the governments of Congo and Uganda in pursuit of 
cross-border raiders under their effective control. 
In the long term, changes in how state sovereignty is defined, combined with the 
reality of truly global, non-state threats, including non-state terror groups, may create a 
need for jus ad bellum to evolve to account for what could be described as an inherent 
right of “global” self-defense. Arguably, ultimately, transnational, networked, non-state 
terror threats can only effectively be addressed through a global, networked response of 
states. The concept of the inherent right of state self-defense may thus have to evolve to 
account for the reality that true, legitimate, security from such threats can only be found 
through collective self-defense and coordinated use of force. Of course, the basis for 
collective security already exists in the UN Charter under 2(4) and Article 42. While 
currently, likely politically unviable, due to the realities of the Security Council and its 
political machinations and divisions, it is not inconceivable that with time, the rise of 
global, transnational threats, such as non-state terror groups, could result in an equal rise, 
or restoration, of the UN Charter’s notion of collective security, adapted to deal with this 
contemporary threat. What might such an “evolved” right of self-defense for use against 
non-state terror actors, operating transnationally, look like? 
Changes in proportionality arguably have already accounted for the geographic 
scope and scale of military operations required to strike at non-state terror actors. 
Enhanced concepts of immanence and accumulation, and the resulting near acceptance of 
a right to anticipatory self-defense have likely addressed the temporal requirements for 
speed of action against non-state terror groups. The primary issue remaining then is the 
often-transnational nature of non-state terror groups and the reality that truly effective 
force must be applied, often times, within multiple states and across varying borders, both 
at groups directly, and also, at the states in which the groups reside. The apparently 
reduced bar for state support only makes such cross border incursions more likely, but no 
less controversial and with potentially negative fallout. Indeed, perhaps more than 
anything else, striking at will in other states, supporting groups or not, to attack groups, 
albeit legitimate threats, creates larger issues of infringement of sovereignty and 
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perceptions of illegitimacy of action amongst local populations, which potentially 
undermines the very governments from whom support is required to defeat non-state 
actors, and driving local populations closer to the very groups that must be defeated.  
Such potential, perceived illegitimacy of action, as seen, is a serious negative 
externality to the use of force against non-state terror groups and the states supporting 
them, given the nature of modern warfare, which is increasingly fought for sources of 
political legitimacy and authority, as well as traditional strategic objectives. The use of 
force in self-defense against non-state terror actors must thus serve both ends to be fully 
effective against non-state terrorist groups operating globally; the elimination of a raw, 
immediate military threat to a state’s own population, but also the greater, long-term 
political, social and economic goals of a larger strategic narrative designed to counter the 
ideological and political goals of the non-state terror groups. 
In practice, advancing jus ad bellum on self-defense to achieve such dual ends 
will be difficult, to say the least, but not without basis or precedent. In fact, organizations, 
such as the United Nations and NATO, were both created with clear provisions for 
collective security. As this paper’s analysis of historical context demonstrated, however, 
it was general fears that those provisions could create, essentially, a sort of suicide pact, 
particularly for smaller states as well inhibit regional security organizations that the 
inherent right of self-defense was in fact prescribed in the UN Charter. Still, the 
collective security provisions remain, and, here again, as seen earlier, in no instance has 
the world truly come closest to utilizing such provisions than in the response to 9/11. 
For the right of self-defense to be applied against non-state terror actors in such a 
way as to serve both military and political ends, it will likely have to evolve to account 
for situations requiring what can perhaps best be described as a global right to self-
defense. Such a right would vest when non-state terror actors operating transnationally 
demonstrate a truly global threat, either through actual armed attack, as 9/11, Bali, 
Madrid, or 7/7, or an accumulation of attacks demonstrating immanency and justifying 
anticipatory defense. Under such a right, the use of force used to counter the armed 
attack, or immanent attack, would be viewed as an international response. A legal bar 
would have to be established to clarify the criteria that would allow such a right to vest, 
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perhaps through Security Council resolution or international, multilateral treaty. This 
right would essentially provide international support and justification for self-defense 
force against the transnational threat wherever it was based—not unlike proposed, 
contemporary adaptations for wiretap laws in the United States to permit the tracking of 
an “individual” instead of specific lines of communication—the justified force would 
follow the threat, and not simply a particular location. This right would provide very 
strong inventive for states to avoid any appearance of support to such non-state groups 
and/or to consent to if not actively request assistance in ridding themselves of such 
groups if they lacked the means to do so alone. It would also carry the weight of the 
international community, providing greater, perceived, if not real, socio-political 
legitimacy. 
The danger of such a right, of course, would be its expansive application in 
unpredictable and untenable locations. Imagine a state asserting such a global right, 
arguing it had international support given previous recognition of a given threat, and then 
using force for a period of years, even in places in which a group simply had agents, 
instead of a base of operations. What would happen, for example, if the Israeli 
government determined that it had a right to conduct targeted killing operations in 
Germany to strike at Hezbollah agents, or if the United States determined it had a right to 
conduct targeted drone strikes in the Sinai to counter alleged growth of Al Qaeda 
operations? Also imagine a despotic regime requesting assistance to rid itself of a threat 
to its own survival, having painted a domestic insurgency as part of a larger, global, non-
state terror network. Clearly, the global right would have to be of very limited and narrow 
scope, only to be applied against truly exceptional threats. 
In some ways, the genuinely international reaction to and support for use of force 
in Afghanistan following 9/11 supports this possibility. Further, as seen from the UK’s 
domestic, legal definition of terrorism, even major powers are increasingly viewing 
terrorism as a truly global threat, and thus, justifying application of counter-terrorism 




targeted. What remains unknown is whether international practice on jus ad bellum on 
self-defense can evolve to make such collective response against non-state terror actors a 
norm, or an exception.  
In addition, finally, two recent international efforts begin to echo the basic 
concept described above. The first, a report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, whose commissioners included former 9/11 Report 
commissioners, attempted to lay down an international consensus on how to balance the 
rights of state sovereignty with the growing recognition of the need to at times bring 
international military intervention when a population is suffering serious harm due to 
insurgency or state failure (ICISS, 2001). The report presents a framework for 
intervention, which would have been unthinkable 60 years ago, or at minimum, deemed 
unnecessary. Perhaps even more importantly, it essentially calls for new emphasis on the 
collective security elements of the UN Charter and the notion that the international 
community has and will at times face genuinely global threats to peace and stability, 
which must be addressed by the international community as a whole.  
The second is an ongoing effort by the UN to create a comprehensive 
international convention for dealing with the whole of international terrorism and 
consolidating the 13 individual treaties that now each, individually address different 
aspects of terrorism ranging from its definition, to WMD and finances (NTI, 2011). The 
goal is to unify these different international legal compacts, and in so doing, clarify and 
make global cooperation on anti-terrorism more efficient. The significance, of course, is 
the recognition of international terrorism a global problem that a common body of 
international law must address. To date, however, the effort has been stymied by debates 
over the definition of terrorism, and in turn, which groups would become officially 
labeled terrorist organizations. 
Such a shift in jus ad bellum would require leadership from the world’s most 
powerful states and a new commitment to an updated notion of collective security against 
global, non-state threats.  
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In truth, the trends identified above indicate that in fact, the world, while 
recognizing a right of self-defense against non-state terror threats, views that right in 
individual terms, and not collective terms, and that the force available to states under that 
right, against non-state terror actors, is only becoming more expansive.  
This examination of the limitations of jus ad bellum on self-defense when applied 
to non-state terror threats thus reveals a fundamental choice currently facing the members 
of the international community. They can choose to accept trends in jus ad bellum 
justifying greater frequency, scope and scale of force, as well as increasingly preemptive 
timing, under the justification of self-defense against non-state terror threats. In doing so, 
states would be preserving their individual, inherent right, while also, likely eroding the 
intended, general prohibition on the use of force. Alternatively, states can choose to 
recognize the true nature of non-state actor terror threats and find a common, mutual right 
of self-defense.  
Jus ad bellum will continue to evolve under either of these paths, as it always has, 
adapting to contemporary strategic, military, political realities and practices. The question 
that will remain is which path of development can truly ensure the just, legitimate and 
effective use of force in self-defense, against non-state terror threats, and which will lead 
instead to retribution, retaliation, and self-interest.  
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